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He’s making a list,
And checking it twice;
Gonna find out who’s naughty and nice.
Santa Claus is coming to town.1
I. Introduction
It is common knowledge that St. Nicholas maintains a comprehensive “naughty 
and nice” list of everyone on the planet.  For untold years the Internal Revenue Service (the 
“Service”) has sought access to Santa’s list for its own purposes, but it has been unsuccessful in 
locating the jolly old elf during his yearly nocturnal visit to this continent.2 Recently, the Service 
has taken a new tack by requiring tax attorneys to maintain their own lists of “naughty” clients.  
The question is:  Must practitioners produce these lists for the Service?
This article examines when, if ever, the attorney-client privilege should permit a
tax practitioner to shield a client’s identity from the Service.  This issue has arisen in connection 
with the Service’s ongoing efforts to combat the current wave of abusive tax shelter activity in 
the United States.3  The Service has issued regulations requiring attorneys and other advisors to 
maintain lists of clients undertaking certain types of tax motivated transactions4 and has taken 
1 J. Fred Coots & Henry Gillespie, Santa Claus is Coming to Town (1934).
2 Even the advanced satellite and radar tracking systems of the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), which have been tasked with tracking Santa’s movements each 
December 24th for the last fifty years (http://www.noradsanta.com), have not enabled the 
Service to catch up with the elusive Mr. Claus.  
3 U.S. Department of Treasury, Bush Administration’s Aggressive Actions to Combat 
Abusive Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 19, 2004, LEXIS 2004 TNT 34-19 [hereinafter 
Aggressive Actions] (discussing recent initiatives aimed at combating tax shelter activity); U.S. 
Department of Treasury, Treasury White Paper on Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY,
July 2, 1999, LEXIS 1999 TNT 127-12, 127-13 [hereinafter Treasury White Paper] (discussing 
the tax shelter problem generally).
4 Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1.
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several prominent law and accounting firms to court seeking such client lists.5  This article 
analyzes the traditional judicial approach to the attorney -client privilege and concludes that a 
client’s identity is unlikely to be protected in tax shelter transactions.  Further, this article argues 
that, as a policy matter, the attorney-client privilege should be limited as it relates to client 
identity in all tax planning situations.  This policy argument derives from the fact that the very 
existence of the attorney-client privilege reflects a societal judgment that its benefits outweigh its 
costs.  However, given the self-assessment nature of the tax system, the societal interests at stake 
in tax planning situations are sufficiently different to warrant limiting the scope of the attorney-
client privilege for all tax planning matters. Consequently, the Service’s actions in seeking client 
identities from attorneys have been proper both under current law and from a broader policy 
perspective.
Part II of this article discusses the attorney-client privilege with a focus on the 
alternative approaches that have developed in the courts and academia for resolving when a 
client-identity privilege exists.  Part III analyzes three situations under the tax law where courts 
have specifically faced the question of whether a client’s identity is privileged.  Part IV first 
examines the extent to which client identity in tax shelter transactions would be privileged under
current law, and suggests a reading of the relevant case law that would generally preclude 
applying the privilege to tax shelter situations.  Then this part examines whether the attorney-
client privilege should be available from a policy perspective in tax planning situations generally.  
After distinguishing an existing academic theory for analyzing the client-identity privilege, this 
article argues that the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege require limiting the client-
5 See e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Background Information:  Strategy to Combat 
Abusive Avoidance Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 15, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 200-13 
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identity privilege in all tax planning situations.  Part V concludes that the Service’s actions in 
pursuing client identities in tax shelter situations have been appropriate under the attorney-client 
privilege as it current exists and are also justified from a policy perspective.  Granting an identity
privilege for tax planning would not promote the underlying policy goals of the attorney-client 
privilege and would work great harm to the fabric of the self-assessment tax system.  
II. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Protection of a Client’s Identity
A. The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest evidentiary privileges recognized 
under the law.6  Despite its long history, the scope of the privilege is still evolving.7 Over time, 
while the privilege has remained, its justification has been the subject of considerable debate.8
(noting enforcement actions against the law firms of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and Jenkens 
& Gilchrist, as well as noting other enforcement activities).
6 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 543 
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (noting that the privilege can be found as far back as the reign of 
Queen Elizabeth); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978) (tracing the evolution of the attorney-client privilege); 2 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181, at 302 (2d ed. 
1994) (noting that the privilege can be traced back to Roman and canon law).
7 Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 60 (2002) (“The law of 
privilege varies greatly from state to state, federal circuit to federal circuit, and context to 
context, and its application often is unclear within particular jurisdictions and even within 
particular cases. Most strikingly, the conflicts and ambiguities are not relegated to the 
margins.”); Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance - Testimonial Privileges 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 780 (2003) (“[Since the adoption of 
the Federal Rule of Evidence 501 the] federal law of attorney-client privilege has evolved in
hundreds of cases at all federal court levels, led by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
four cases since 1976.”)  In 1975 Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence (Public Law 
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975)) which consciously left the law of evidentiary privileges to 
common-law development.  Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that the federal common-law 
of privileges applies to federal-question and federal criminal cases, while state law privilege 
rules are applicable to cases in federal courts where state law is at issue.  Consequently, for 
federal income tax issues it is the federal common-law attorney-client privilege that is applied.
8 See Hazard, supra note 6; Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege: A Territorial Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 913-14 (1991) (describing the various 
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The modern formulation of the attorney-client privilege owes much to the views of Dean John 
Henry Wigmore and his highly influential treatise on the rules of evidence.9  Dean Wigmore 
defended the attorney-client privilege on the basis of practical concerns regarding the necessity 
of the privilege in promoting a free and frank discussion between clients and their attorneys.10
This utilitarian approach derived from his general method for analyzing all evidentiary 
privileges.  More specifically, Wigmore identified four necessary elements for the recognition of 
any evidentiary privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be 
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation 
between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the 
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) 
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained 
for the correct disposal of litigation.11
After finding that the attorney-client privilege satisfied all these conditions , Wigmore concluded
that “[i]n order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension 
policy justifications for the attorney-client privilege); JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-
CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04 (3d ed. 2001) (same). 
9 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Will 
Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 
241, 241 (2002) (“Theory plays such a prominent role in privilege doctrine in large part due to 
the continuing influence of that giant of American evidence law, Dean John Henry Wigmore.
More specifically, theory has assumed a major role in this area because of the sway still 
exercised by Wigmore’s treatment of privilege doctrine in volume eight of his classic treatise.”)  
Wigmore’s continuing importance to privilege law is vividly demonstrated by the Supreme 
Court’s heavy reliance on Wigmore in its two most recent privilege decisions, Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) and Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406 (1998).
10 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2291, at 545.
11 Id. § 2285, at 527.
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of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; and hence the law must prohibit 
such disclosure except on the client’s consent.”12
For purposes of this article, the last two prongs of Wigmore’s test are particularly 
germane.  These requirements recognize that there are always winners and losers in any privilege 
question.  By their very nature evidentiary privileges entail one party seeking the disclosure of 
information over another party’s objection.  If no privilege applies the adverse party may be 
harmed by the revelation of the confidence.  Alternatively, if the privilege obtains then the 
requesting party will be denied access to information that could be highly relevant to the just 
administration of the law.  But the winners and losers extend beyond the parties in any particular 
controversy.  The very existence of an evidentiary privilege reflects a societal decision regarding 
whether a privilege is beneficial.13 Clearly society has a strong interest in compelling all persons 
with knowledge of the truth to make it known.  However, there may well be competing societal 
interests that would be promoted by allowing such confidences to remain secret.  Consequently, 
the law’s recognition of an evidentiary privilege reflects a weighing of which position presents 
the greatest net benefit to society as a whole.
One hundred years after the first edition of Wigmore’s treatise,14 the attorney-
client privilege is still predominately defended based on this type of utilitarian weighing of 
12 Id. § 2291, at 545.
13 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very 
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good 
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining 
truth.”); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE] (noting that privilege rules protect societal interests at the cost of the 
efficient administration of justice).
14 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904).
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competing societal interests.15 The privilege is justified because ensuring confidential client 
communications encourages clients to fully appraise their attorneys of all the facts necessary to 
address the legal issue at hand.16  Such open communications reap significant benefits for society 
as a whole by, among other things, strengthening our adversarial system of justice,17 enhancing 
15 While various commentators have asserted non-utilitarian justifications for the attorney-
client privilege, the utilitarian explanation remains the primary rationale. MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 87, at 344 (noting that the utilitarian purpose is the principal 
justification today); Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World: 
An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1703 (1995) (noting that modern 
trend is a utilitarian justification); Note, Developments in the Law - Privileged Communication: 
Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 1471, 1486-87 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communication] (characterizing the 
privilege’s utilitarian purpose as predominant); Glynn, supra note 7, 69 (“[N]one of [the non-
utilitarian] justifications can fully explain the modern privilege, which applies in criminal and 
civil contexts, protects attorney-client communications made in and outside of litigation, is 
generally unqualified, and affords protection for both natural and corporate persons. Rather, the 
widely accepted, overarching purpose for the modern attorney-client privilege is utilitarian or 
instrumental.”).  Non-utilitarian explanations for the attorney-client privilege are typically based 
on the theory that individual rights justify protecting attorney-client communications from 
disclosure.  See, e.g., Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 307, 312-319 (1991) (surveying various non-utilitarian theories for the attorney-
client privilege).  For instance, the attorney-client privilege can be said to protect an individual’s 
right to privacy by preventing the disclosure of embarrassing personal information.  David W. 
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 
TUL. L. REV. 101, 110 (1956).  Similarly, the attorney-client privilege can be seen as a powerful 
tool to promote individual autonomy.  Ready access to legal champions can empower individuals 
without legal training to assert and defend their rights.  Making communications privileged 
ensures that the dialogue between the attorney and client is frank and encourages individuals to 
explore their legal options with an advisor.  Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976).  One problem with 
justifying the attorney-client privilege on the basis of individual liberty, is that this rationale for 
the privilege has little weight when a corporation or other juridical entity is the client.  See 
GERGACZ, supra note 8, ¶ 1.04; James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of Attorney-Client Privilege
(Part II), 8 VILL. L. REV. 447, 498 (1963); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The 
Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 185-86
(1993).
16 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1980) (“The purpose of the privilege is to 
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”). 
17 United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (“open client and attorney 
communication [is central] to the proper functioning of our adversary system of justice”).
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judicial efficiency,18 and promoting compliance with the law.19 If an attorney is in full command 
of all the relevant facts, she can better prepare the client’s case, assert otherwise overlooked 
defenses, and prepare in advance for any damaging evidence.20 Consequently, the adversarial 
system is more likely to result in the truth being revealed and injustices being avoided.21  When 
clients are encouraged to fully inform their legal advisors regarding the true facts, the attorney is 
in a much better position to realistically appraise the merits of the legal issue in question.  Thus, 
the attorney is in a better able to propose appropriate settlements or to advise against litigation in 
the first instance, and judicial resources are thereby conserved.  Finally, when a client is 
encouraged to reveal illegal or questionable plans to his attorney, the attorney is positioned to 
educate the client regarding the law’s requirements and stands a much better chance of 
dissuading such actions before they are undertaken.  The attorney-client privilege therefore can 
be said to promote compliance with the law.22 The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted this 
purpose as the main societal goal served by the attorney-client privilege.23 In light of the 
significant benefits to the legal system as a whole produced by the attorney-client privilege, the 
18 Goode, supra note 15, at 315 (“trials proceed more smoothly and efficiently when the 
lawyers are fully appraised of the facts”).
19 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
20 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2291, at 553; 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE §  5472, at 85 (1986); Stern & Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney 
Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1825-26 (1988).
21 Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358 (1989).
22 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (privilege promotes “compliance with the ever growing and 
increasingly complex body of public law.”).
23 Id. at 392 (promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients 
“encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice”); Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“[T]he attorney-client 
privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and 
their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of 
justice.”); Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562; Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
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traditional judgment of courts and legislatures has been that such benefits outweigh the 
competing societal interest of requiring the truth to always be made known.
Since society has determined that the benefits of the attorney-client privilege 
outweigh its societal costs, the question becomes how the privilege should be defined and where 
it should be limited to best reflect this societal cost-benefit analysis.  The classic formulation of 
the attorney-client privilege is also directly attributable to Wigmore, who maintained that the 
privilege applies:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence 
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) 
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the 
protection be waived.24
With this basic understanding of the attorney-client privilege and its present 
justification, the specific question of when a client ’s identity should be protected by the privilege 
can be undertaken.
B. Client Identity as a Privileged Communication
24 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292, at 554.  The other oft quoted source for the elements of 
the attorney-client privilege is United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 89 F. Supp. 357, 
358-59 (D. Mass. 1950), where the court stated:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege 
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the 
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar . . . and (b) in 
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the 
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) 
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or 
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and 
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the 
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
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Almost every case examining whether a client’s identity is considered privileged 
information starts with the proposition that such information is generally not privileged.25  This 
basic rule is typically justified by reference to the prima facie requirements for applying the 
privilege.  Thus it is argued that a client’s identity does not meet the Wigmore requirements 
because:  (1) a client’s identity is typically conveyed to the attorney prior to the formation of the 
attorney-client relationship and therefore, since it is not information conveyed as part of the 
attorney-client relationship, it is not subject to protection;26 and (2) a client’s name is not eligible 
25 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (“It is 
well recognized in every circuit, including our own, that the identity of an attorney’s client and 
the source of payment for legal fees are not normally protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.”).  See also, Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Goddard 
v. United States, 131 F.2d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 1942); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 
(1944); Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948); Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. 
Supp. 914, 915 (D. Mass. 1958); Colton v. United States, 308 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 905 (1969); United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Michaelson, 
511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th 
Cir. 1975); United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 
F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Walsh, 823 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1980); In re 
Grand Jury Witness (Salas & Waxman), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Lahodny, 695 
F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th 
Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 
1246 (1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(85 Misc. 140), 791 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Subpoena to 
Testify to Wine, 841 F.2d 230, 233 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 
(Newton), 899 F.2d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868
(1994); United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 1995).
26 See, e.g., In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1983); Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 
F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948); People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 
714, 718, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 242 A.D. 611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1934) (“The mere fact of the engagement of counsel is out of the rule because the privilege 
and duty of being silent do not arise until that fact is ascertained.”); Goode, supra note 15, at 
334-35 (noting the argument that “the attorney-client privilege presupposes an attorney-client 
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for protection under the attorney-client privilege since it is not typically conveyed with an 
expectation of confidentiality.27  While these legal justifications have been questioned, this basic 
rule that the client identity is not privileged is firmly entrenched in the law.28
Nevertheless, in a number of cases the courts have found a client’s identity 
privileged despite the generally accepted rule to the contrary.29  While the logic and reasoning 
underlying such decisions is often muddled, three, sometimes overlapping, approaches to the 
client-identity privilege question can be discerned:30  (1) the legal advice exception; (2) the last 
link exception; and (3) the confidential communication exception.  The legal advice exception 
maintains that a client’s identity should be withheld when revealing the identity “would 
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the legal advice was sought.”31  The 
relationship. Statements of identity, which are preliminary to the formation of the relationship, 
are therefore not privileged.”).  
27 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2313, at 609 (“The identity of the attorney’s client . . . will 
seldom be a matter communicated in confidence because the procedure of litigation ordinarily 
presupposes a disclosure of these facts.  Furthermore, so far as a client may in fact desire secrecy 
and may be able to secure action without appearing as a party to the proceedings, it would be 
improper to sanction such a wish.  Every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his 
opponents.”). 
28 Seymour Glanzer & Paul R. Taskier, Attorneys Before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client’s Identity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070, 
1078 (1984) (“And, it may be argued, that if the existence of the identity exclusion were to be 
weighed today, de novo and without the baggage of precedent, the important purpose of an 
inviolable attorney-client privilege would outweigh the inherited rationales of the past.”).
29 See generally, Diane M. Allen, Attorney’s Disclosure, in Federal Proceedings, of Identity 
of Client as Violating Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 852 (2003) and cases cited 
therein.
30 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Privileged Communication, supra note 15, at 1518-22; Goode, supra note 15, at 325-35;
Matthew P. Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, IRS Form 8300: The Attorney-Client Privilege And Tax 
Policy Become Casualties In The War Against Money Laundering,  24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 623, 
648-52(1996); Note, Turning Lawyers into Witnesses: Does Forced Client Disclosure Breach the 
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 795, 816-17 (1997); Comment, Legal and 
Professional Ethics: Protection of Client Identity, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 297, 301-09 (2002); Allen, 
supra note 29.
31 U.S. v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
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last link exception represents a narrowing of the legal advice exception by holding that client 
identity is only privileged if its revelation would supply “the last link in an existing chain of 
incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client’s indictment.”32  The confidential 
communication exception provides that a client’s identity is protected when such identification 
would be “in substance a disclosure of the confidential communication in the professional 
relationship between the client and the attorney.”33
While courts often cite one or more of these exceptions when discussing client-
identity privilege issues, the modern trend is to rely primarily on the confidential communication
exception.34  This trend recognizes that the first two exceptions focus on the incriminatory effect 
of disclosing the client’s name, rather than the policy of facilitating the free flow of information 
necessary for attorneys to provide competent legal advice.35 While clients often convey 
incriminating facts to their attorneys, the attorney-client privilege shields this information from 
discovery because doing so promotes the larger societal goal of fostering compliance with the 
law.  The incriminatory nature of any information conveyed is a purely secondary consideration 
compared to the larger policy goal underlying the attorney-client privilege.  This can be seen in 
the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.  If applying the privilege does not further the 
policy goal of promoting compliance with the law in a particular situation, then often the 
privilege is not applied despite the fact that the information might be incriminating.  For 
instance, the attorney-client privilege does not apply to confidential communications regarding a 
32 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982).
33 In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983).
34 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § ___, at ___ (“Today, happily, there is a marked trend 
toward refocusing upon the essential purpose of the privilege by extending its protection to client 
identity and fee arrangements only if the net effect of the disclosure would be to reveal the nature 
of a client communication.”).
35 See Goode, supra note 15, at 328-29; Harrington & Lustig, supra note 30, at 651.
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future crime or continuing fraud.36 Similarly, facts that an attorney discovers independently or 
from third parties are not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege even if they 
are incriminating.37
It is not the incriminatory nature of information that prompts society to grant the 
privilege; rather, it is promoting free communications with the goal of creating greater 
compliance with the law.  Consequently, the mere fact that revealing the client’s identity would 
tend to incriminate the client does not directly indicate that there is a confidential client 
communication at stake deserving of protection in the eyes of society.38 For a client’s identity to 
be privileged it must be shown that revealing the client’s name would also reveal information 
conveyed confidentially to the attorney in seeking legal advice.  Since the confidential 
communication exception focuses directly on this question, it is the approach most closely 
36 See WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2298, at 573; United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63
(1989) (“The attorney-client privilege must necessarily protect the confidences of wrongdoers, 
but the reason for that protection -- the centrality of open client and attorney communication to 
the proper functioning of our adversary system of justice – ‘ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, 
namely, where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing.’” 
(quoting Wigmore)).
37 See, e.g., In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[F]acts which an attorney 
receives from a third party about a client are not privileged.  Extension of the privilege to this 
information would not serve to protect and foster the client’s freedom of expression.”). 
38 For instance, assume Joe works as a janitor.  For the last two years he has reported his 
annual janitorial income of $10,000 on his tax return.  However, Joe is also engaged in an illegal 
activity that produces large amounts of cash which he does not report.  As a personal matter 
unrelated to his illegal business, Joe hires an attorney to handle a complex child adoption case 
for him and pays the attorney $100,000 in cash.  Joe never reveals or discusses his illegal 
business with the attorney.  The Service learns of the large cash payment and orders the attorney 
to reveal the identity of the payor.  If Joe’s identity is revealed the Service will check his past tax 
returns and see that Joe reported only $20,000 of income over the last two years.  Consequently, 
linking Joe to the large cash payment is highly incriminatory since it indicates he may have 
underreported his past income and it raises questions about whether the $100,000 was obtained 
legally.  Nevertheless, revealing Joe’s identity does not reveal any confidential communication 
made to the attorney since Joe never retained the attorney to deal with his tax matters or his 
illegal business.  In this case the confidential communication exception would not shield Joe’s 
identity despite the incriminatory effect of the revelation.
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aligned with the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege.  The confidential communication 
exception typically applies where revealing the client’s identity indicates the client’s motive in 
seeking legal advice, and said motive in turn indicates that the client admitted his guilt to his 
attorney.  
While the confidential communication exception is more attuned to the 
underlying policy of the attorney-client privilege than the other two exceptions, it unfortunately 
can lead to widely divergent results based on a particular court’s view of whether revealing the 
attorney-client relationship actually results in a sufficiently clear inference regarding a client’s 
motives for seeking legal assistance.  In this regard it is interesting to contrast the similar cases of 
In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Cherney)39 and Vingelli v. United States.40
In Cherney a lawyer was paid by a third party to represent a defendant, Hrvatin, in 
a drug conspiracy trial.  Several years later the attorney, Cherney, was subpoenaed by a grand 
jury and asked to divulge Hrvatin’s benefactor.  Cherney refused on the grounds that the 
benefactor’s identity was protected by the attorney-client privilege.  On in camera review, it was 
revealed to the court that the benefactor was a pre-existing client of Cherney’s and that the pre-
existing representation involved consultations regarding the benefactor’s involvement in the 
same drug conspiracy in which Hrvatin had been charged.  On these facts the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the application of the attorney-client privilege to protect the benefactor’s identity.  The 
court believed that revealing the benefactor’s identity in light of the already revealed facts would 
be tantamount to revealing the benefactor’s motive (i.e., to obtain advice about participation in a 
drug conspiracy) in retaining Cherney.  Since this motive would itself have been a confidential 
39 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990).
40 992 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).
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communication (i.e., admitting complicity in the conspiracy to the attorney), the confidential 
communication exception applied. 
In Vingelli the Second Circuit applied the confidential communication exception
to a similar situation but reached the opposite result.  In this case Vingelli, an attorney in 
Arizona, transmitted $5,000 on behalf of a client to an attorney in Vermont to cover the legal 
defense of a defendant, Lovell, in a Vermont drug conspiracy case.  A grand jury investigating 
the conspiracy learned of Vingelli’s role and demanded that Vingelli reveal the identity of 
Lovell’s benefactor.  Vingelli refused, asserting the attorney-client privilege.  The Second Circuit 
held on these facts that revealing the benefactor’s name would not necessarily reveal his motive 
in seeking Vingelli’s assistance.  The court stated that since alternative inferences could be 
drawn (e.g., that the benefactor, while wanting to help a friend or relative, wished to do so
anonymously out of fear of guilt by association), revealing the benefactor’s identity would not 
reveal the motive for seeking legal advice or even whether any legal advice was in fact sought by 
the benefactor.  
The stark difference in results between Cherney and Vingelli seems to be directly
attributable to the facts the attorneys revealed to the court about the actual nature of their 
consultations with the benefactor.  In Cherney the in camera review of documents indicated that 
the benefactor was actually consulting Cherney independently regarding his actual involvement 
in the drug conspiracy.  However, in Vingelli it appears that the attorney revealed to the court 
that the benefactor was a long time client who sought “advice concerning the ramifications of 
lending $5,000 to a criminal defendant and having contacts with that defendant.”41
41 Id. at 453.
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The confidential communication exception provides a coherent analytical basis 
for applying the client-identity privilege since it focuses on whether any client communication 
would be implicitly revealed by revealing the client’s identity.42  Nevertheless, the exception has 
been criticized as not fully adhering to the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege.43 This 
criticism centers on the risk that clients will be dissuaded from seeking legal advice under the 
confidential communication exception.  As discussed earlier, the ultimate goal of the attorney-
client privilege is to promote compliance with the law.44  This goal is achieved by fostering free 
and frank client communications, which in turn relies on clients being assured that their 
communications will be confidential.  Implicit in this approach is the position that the attorney-
client privilege should encourage potential clients to seek legal assistance in the first place.  If 
potential clients are dissuaded from seeking legal advice, then there will be no frank 
communications and no attorney guidance to assist potential clients in complying with the law.
Criticisms of the confidential communication exception take two forms.  The first 
focuses on the test’s reliance on an ex post factual analysis.  Since potential clients may be 
uncertain regarding whether their identity ultimately will be upheld as privileged under such a 
fact intensive inquiry, they may decide not to seek legal assistance.45 The second line of 
criticism focuses on the reality that the exception would permit the government to engage in 
generalized “fishing expeditions” as a means of identifying candidates for future investigations 
42 See Harrington & Lustig, supra note 30, at 651 (“the confidential communications 
exception seems to provide the soundest argument for protecting client identity”).
43 See Goode, supra note 15, at 332-33.
44 See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
45 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“[Clients] must be able 
to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An 
uncertain privilege, or one which purposes to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”); H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-
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of wrongdoing.46 For instance, assume that there have been a string of unsolved murders in Big 
City over the last year.  The police, having run out of other leads, wish to obtain the client lists of 
the five most prominent homicide defense attorneys in the area.  The attorneys refuse, claiming 
their clients’ names are protected under the attorney-client privilege.  A court applying the 
confidential communication exception could well find that revealing the clients’ identities on 
these facts would not reveal their specific motives in seeking counsel or any other confidential 
client communication.  However, if the government is successful in attempts to gain such 
information, potential clients are likely to be dissuaded from seeking legal advice for fear that the 
mere fact that they consulted an attorney could be used to single them out for government 
scrutiny.47
In light of these criticisms, one commentator has proposed an alternative theory 
for resolving client-identity privilege issues, the “status-as-client” approach.48  The status-as-
client approach departs from the confidential communication exception by focusing on the risk 
that potential clients would be dissuaded from seeking legal advice if client-identity information 
is not privileged.  Under this standard, a client’s identity is privileged whenever the 
government’s reason for seeking the information is to determine whether the client sought legal 
advice.  When identity information is sought merely as a means of uncovering some other 
information, then the privilege would not apply even though an attorney is involved and the 
disclosure might be incriminating.  
Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 
KY. L. J. 1191, 1195-96 (1999); Glynn, supra note 7, at 62.
46 Goode, supra note 15, at 332, 336.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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Applying the status-as-client test to benefactor situations like Cherney  and 
Vingelli will illustrate the approach.  The benefactors in those cases were both clearly seeking 
independent legal advice from their attorneys.  However, they were also using their attorneys as 
a means for providing legal assistance to a third party.  If a grand jury were requesting 
information regarding clients that had consulted an attorney about involvement in drug 
trafficking, that would be impermissible as seeking to identify clients due to their status as 
clients.  Since potential clients would be dissuaded from seeking legal advice in such situations 
for fear that their illegal activities could be discovered as a result, a client-identity privilege 
should apply.
However, if the grand jury merely wished to know who provided the funds to pay 
for another person’s legal defense, such information would be discoverable under the status-as-
client approach.  This is true despite the fact that the grand jury’s underlying reason for seeking 
this information is to locate a target for further investigation and that revealing the information 
may be highly incriminating.  Allowing a client’s identity to be discoverable in this situation 
does not in fact dissuade prospective clients from seeking legal advice.  Their status as a seeker 
of purely legal advice is protected under the status-as-client approach since the government 
cannot directly seek that information.  However, if they attempt to use their attorney in a non-
legal capacity (e.g., to transfer funds to another person), they risk having their identity exposed.  
Making identity information non-privileged in such cases dissuades the use of attorneys for non-
legal purposes and limits the scope of the attorney-client privilege to purely matters of legal 
advice.  Similarly, the status-as-client approach would prevent the government from undertaking 
fishing expeditions seeking to identify individuals for investigation based on the fact that they 
sought legal advice about their actions.
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The status-as-client approach and the confidential communication exception both 
represent policy based approaches to resolving the client-identity privilege issue.  However, in 
some cases these two theories reach opposite conclusions.  While the status-as-client approach’s 
focus on encouraging clients to seek counsel remedies one shortcoming of the confidential 
communication exception, the status-as-client approach itself fails to fully implement the policy 
underlying the attorney-client privilege in all cases.  In particular, the status-as-client approach is 
premised on the assumption that a client’s motive in seeking legal assistance is in fac t a 
confidential communication deserving of societal protection.49 Consequently, while both 
theories provide valuable insights into how the client-identity issue can be resolved, neither 
provides a complete answer by itself.  Consequently, in the discussion that follows both the 
confidential communication exception and the status-as-client approach will be analyzed in the 
context of various tax related transactions.  
III. Client-Identity Privilege in a Federal Income Tax Context
The question of whether an attorney must disclose a client’s identity has arisen in 
a number of federal income tax situations.  The following discussion will examine these areas in 
light of both the confidential communication exception and the status-as-client approach.
A. Section 6050I Authorities
In 1984, Congress enacted section 6050I of the Internal Revenue Code (the 
“Code”).  Section 6050I provides that “any person who is engaged in a trade or business, and 
who in the course of such trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in cash in one 
transaction (or two or more related transactions)” must disclose this fact and relevant identifying 
49 Id. at 333-35.
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information to the Service.50  This provision’s original purpose was to combat underreporting of 
taxable income by persons with large cash incomes.51  However, Congress subsequently 
transformed the provision into a powerful tool for identifying individuals engaged in drug 
trafficking and other illegal activities by permitting the Service to share information obtained 
with other federal agencies engaged in criminal law enforcement activities.52  Since attorneys are 
engaged in a trade or business, any cash payments in excess of $10,000 that they receive from 
clients must be disclosed to the Service pursuant to section 6050I.  The statute contains no 
exclusion for payments made to attorneys, and despite intense pressure from the practicing bar,53
neither Congress nor the Service has created such an exclusion in the twenty years since the 
provision was enacted.  
Despite the absence of any attorney exception, through the mid-1990s attorneys 
frequently attempted to avoid disclosing the identity of their cash paying clients by asserting that 
such information was protected under the attorney-client privilege.54  However, the courts 
routinely rejected any assertion of identity privilege on the grounds that a client’s method of 
payment was not itself privileged information  and that revealing the client’s identity in 
50 I.R.C. § 6050I.
51 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 491 (Comm. Print 1984).
52 I.R.C. § 6103(i).
53 Goode, supra note 15, at 310 (describing bar actions with respect to section 6050I); See 
Harrington & Lustig, supra note 30, at 624 (same); Note, I.R.C. §  6050I and The Attorney-
Client Privilege: The Misplaced Emphasis On Incrimination Over Confidentiality, 1996 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 509, 512-13 (1996) (same).
54 For a general discussion of the case law in this area see, Brian L. Porto, Attorney-Client 
Privilege and the Reporting of Cash Transactions in Excess of $10,000, as Required by §  6050I 
of the Internal Revenue Code, 152 A.L.R. FED. 459, 474 (1999).
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connection with revealing his mode of payment would not disclose any client confidential 
communication.55 In this regard the Ninth Circuit went so far as to state: 
Our case law spells out the narrow circumstances under which fee-
payer identity and fee arrangements may be protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. Only in the extremely rare case will the 
receipt of cash for fees be so intertwined with the subject of 
representation as to obviate compliance with 6050I. We are hard 
pressed to imagine such a case, and decline to provide an 
illustration.56
United States v. Sindel57 is one of the few cases finding that the requirements of 
the confidential communication exception were satisfied in a section 6050I context.  In Sindel, an 
attorney reported certain cash transactions from two different clients to the Service but omitted 
any identifying information under a claim of privilege.  The Eighth Circuit, after examining the 
attorney in camera, ruled that the attorney “could not release information about the payments on 
behalf of [the first client] without revealing the substance of a confidential communication.”58
However, with respect to the second client the court ruled that no confidential communication 
would be disclosed if that client’s identity was revealed.  The court gave no indication of what 
factors were reveled in camera that prompted the different conclusion with respect to the two 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Leventhal, 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 
(1994).  
56 Blackman, 72 F.3d at 1426.
57 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995).  Client identity was also protected from section 6050I 
disclosure in United States v. Gertner, 873 F.Supp. 729 (D.Mass.), aff’d in part, 65 F.3d 963 (1st 
Cir. 1995).  However, the district court there did not base its conclusion on the confidential 
communication exception.  The basis for the district court’s attorney-client privilege position 
seems to have been that Constitutional considerations should inform the attorney-client privilege 
analysis when criminal actions are already proceeding against the undisclosed client.  In any 
event, the court’s analysis of this issue was specifically identified as dicta by the First Circuit on 
appeal.  The First Circuit affirmed the case on the grounds that the Service had made procedural 
errors in issuing the summons requesting the client’s identity.  Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 972-73.
58 Sindel, 53 F.3d at 876.
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clients.  Consequently, the case again illustrates that the ex post nature of the inquiry can lead to 
dramatically different results under the confidential communication exception.  
The weight of decided case authority under section 6050I recognizes that client 
identity and fee information is generally outside the attorney-client privilege and only very rarely 
will the confidential communication exception apply to create protection.59  The same resolution 
of these cases would be reached under the status-as-client approach.  When the Service seeks to 
uncover the mode of a client’s payment, it is not seeking to determine anything about the reasons 
that the client sought legal advice.  Since clients desiring confidentiality for their identity can 
avoid any risk of identity disclosure by paying their legal bills in a form other than cash (e.g., by 
using a personal check or a cashier’s check), applying section 6050I to attorneys should not 
adversely impact the inclination of potential clients to seek legal advice.60
B. Anonymous Tax Payment s
Certainly the most famous client identity case involving federal income taxes is 
Baird v. Koener.61 In that case Baird, a tax attorney, was consulted by a general practice 
attorney representing several unidentified business people.  The attorney revealed to Baird that 
59 See cases cited in note 55, supra. See also, Porto, supra note 54; Michael B. Himmel,
What Lawyers Need To Know About Accepting Cash From Clients, 26 CHAMPION 12, 14 (June 
2002) (surveying the case law and concluding that an attorney’s “refusal to disclose a client’s 
information [under section 6050I] will usually result in a court order compelling the attorney to 
disclose the information. Additionally, the attorney may face criminal and civil penalties.”).
60 Goode, supra note 15, at 351-52.  However, cashier’s checks, money orders and 
traveler’s checks with face amounts of less than $10,000 are treated as cash for the purposes of 
enforcing section 6050I. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I(c)(ii).  Cashier’s checks and similar 
instruments in amounts of $10,000 or more are excluded since any bank issuing such instruments 
for cash would itself be required to file a report with the Service under section 6050I.
61 279 F.2d 623, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1960).  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-
35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984) (calling Baird
“seminal”); Privileged Communication, supra note 15, at 1518 (noting that all the client identity 
exceptions can be traced to Baird); Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 28, at 1080 (Baird “seminal”).
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the accountants for these business people had determined that insufficient taxes had been paid for 
one or more prior years.  While none of the business people were currently under audit by the 
Service, they wished to mitigate their exposure to interest, penalties, and perhaps criminal action 
by the Service if the underpayments were eventually discovered.  Baird advised the attorney that 
the business people should remit the amount they believed owed to the Service on an anonymous
basis.  To this end, the attorney provided Baird with a cashier’s check to cover the relevant 
amount, which Baird then transmitted to the Service with a cover letter of explanation.  Baird 
never learned the identity of the business people involved.  After receiving the remittance, the 
Service issued Baird a summons demanding he identify the clients on whose behalf the 
anonymous remittance was made.  Baird refused, asserting that the attorney-client privilege
applied.62
In a decision containing language forming the genesis of all three judicially 
recognized client identity exceptions,63 the Ninth Circuit found the privilege applicable and 
refused to force Baird to reveal the identity of the business people or their attorney.  The court 
acknowledged that a client’s identity is not normally privileged, but found that an exception
existed when the purpose of requesting the client’s identity was to obtain an admission of guilt.64
In finding that this exception applied, the court stated:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception 
to the general rule. Here money was received by the government, 
62 Baird, 279 F.2d at 627.
63 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 452 (6th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984) (noting that the legal advice, last link, and 
confidential communication exceptions all are traceable to Baird). 
64 While this exception was grounded in California state privilege law, the exception has 
now become part of the federal common law on the attorney-client privilege.  California 
privilege law was applicable in Baird because it was decided prior to the adoption of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501.  
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paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a 
sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the 
past.  The names of the clients are useful to the government for but 
one purpose – to ascertain which taxpayers think they were 
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or 
several years. The volunteer nature of the payment indicates a 
belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are 
due than the sum previously paid, if any.  It indicates a feeling of 
guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is 
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain 
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. 
Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the 
attorney here involved was employed --  to advise his clients what, 
under the circumstances, should be done.65
Baird and other cases dealing with this situation66 establish that client identity is 
generally protected when an attorney facilitates an anonymous restitution.  This conclusion is 
easily reached under the logic of the confidential communication exception.  Since revealing the 
client’s identity is tantamount to revealing an admission of guilt by the client, the identity should 
be derivatively protected to avoid disclosing the clearly privileged admission of guilt.  
Nevertheless, the status-as-client approach would reach the opposite conclusion in 
these cases.67 While consulting an attorney regarding prior tax underpayments would be 
privileged absent other activities, employing the attorney for the non-legal function of actually 
delivering the payment would not be protected.  Under the status-as-client approach a client 
could freely consult an attorney regarding the advisability of and best method for making a 
restitution payment without fear that her identity could be obtained from the attorney.  However, 
if she then also employed the attorney as the means to facilitate the actual restitution, the status-
as-client approach would allow her identity to be discovered since the attorney would be acting 
65 Baird, 279 F.2d at 633 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
66 An identical result was reached by the Seventh Circuit regarding an anonymous tax 
payment in Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).  See also, Silver, Courts Are 
Upholding Attorney-Client Privilege in Anonymous Payment Situations, 43 J. TAX’N 358 (1975).
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as a mere “bagman” and not as a provider of a legal service.  Consequently, the status-as-client 
approach would not dissuade potential clients from seeking counsel for legal advice, but it would 
discourage them from also employing attorneys to perform non-legal tasks.
C. Identification of Clients Undertaking Specified Transactions
A third category of client identity cases arising under the federal income tax laws 
relates to situations where the Service knows that a questionable tax minimization transaction 
exists but it cannot readily identify the taxpayers involved.  In such cases, the Service may 
attempt to extract client information from the tax attorneys involved in structuring the 
transaction.  The law in this area is still developing and the case results are mixed.68 This section 
will focus on describing how the existing case law in this area has applied the confidential 
communication exception.  It will also discuss how the status-as-client approach would apply to 
this situation.  This article’s critique of the law in this area is reserved for Part IV.
1. The Pro- Taxpayer Authority:  Liebman and Arthur Anderson 
The case most frequently cited by tax practitioners seeking to avoid disclosing a 
client’s identity in tax planning situations is United States v. Liebman.69 In Liebman a law firm 
specialized in investigating and evaluating tax advantaged partnership investments.  The firm 
only charged clients a fee if they actually invested in the subject partnerships.  Additionally, it 
67 Goode, supra note 15, at 339-40.
68 Several provisions of the Code and associated regulations require the maintenance of 
investor lists for certain types of tax motivated transactions.  While these provisions do not 
explicitly provide that they supercede the attorney-client privilege in the context of such 
transactions, it can be argued that in operation they do preclude the application of the 
confidential communication exception to such transactions.  Since the resolution of this issue is 
unclear, the discussion in this section is premised on the continued availability of the confidential 
communication exception for transactions covered by these investor list maintenance rules.  The 
impact of the listing requirements will be discussed in Part IV.A.2 and B.2, infra.
69 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).
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was know by the Service, and admitted by the law firm, that the firm also advised clients that any
fee paid was immediately deductible for tax purposes as a legal expense.  The Service believed 
that such fees were in substance non-deductible brokerage charges.  After unsuccessfully 
attempting to identify the partnerships involved or the clients who had paid fees to the law firm, 
the Service issued a summons to the law firm to compel disclosure of the clients who had paid 
fees in connection with partnership investments.  The law firm asserted the attorney-client 
privilege and refused to disclose its clients’ identities.  
In finding that the attorney-client privilege protected the identity of the clients, the 
Third Circuit focused on the fact that since the Service already knew the content of the advice 
the law firm gave, it would be improper to force disclosure of the client’s identity.
If the summons merely requested the names of clients who paid 
fees, the information would not be protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.  However, the summons is more specific.  The affidavit 
of the IRS agent supporting the request for the summons not only 
identifies the subject matter of the attorney-client communication, 
but also describes its substance.  That is, the affidavit does more 
than identify the communications as relating to the deductibility of 
legal fees paid to Liebman & Flaster in connection with the 
acquisition of a real estate partnership interest.  It goes on to reveal 
the content of the communication, namely that “taxpayers . . . were 
advised by Liebman & Flaster that the fee was deductible for 
income tax purposes.”  Thus, this case falls within the situation 
where “so much of the actual communication had already been 
established, that to disclose the client’s name would disclose the 
essence of a confidential communication. . . .” See United States v. 
Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976) (and cases cited 
therein).70
While essentially relying on a form of the confidential communication exception, 
the Third Circuit’s logic is suspect in two regards.  First, it implies that if the Service had merely 
suspected – and not actually known – that the law firm advised that the fees were deductible, the 
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clients’ identities would not have been protected.  This position has the potential for turning the 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege on its head.  Normally a client’s identity is not privileged, 
but the substance of the client’s communications with an attorney is privileged.  However, under 
the Liebman approach if a client and law firm decide that the client’s identity is the more crucial 
information to be kept secret, they could apparently arrange for the substance of the 
representation and the advice given to become known, and then assert privilege for the client’s 
identity.  
Secondly, it is not clear why revealing the law firm’s advice regarding 
deductibility revealed any confidential communication covered by the attorney-client privilege.  
Under the standard formulation of the attorney-client privilege, only communications by the 
client qualify for the privilege’s protection.71  While legal advice received by a client is often 
derivatively privileged (since knowing the advice would typically implicitly reveal the client’s 
concerns and motives in seeking the advice),72 it is not clear that that was the case in Liebman.  
The Liebman clients were seeking advice about the tax consequences of investing in certain 
partnerships.  While the law firm apparently also advised them regarding the deductibility of the 
legal fees they paid to obtain the tax advice regarding the investment, revealing the deductibility 
70 Id. at 809 (some citations omitted).
71 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292, at 554 (referring to communications made “by the 
client”); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950)
(same).
72 See, e.g., EEOC v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 145 F.R.D. 74, 76 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (“In 
federal courts, [the] attorney-client privilege extends to confidential communications between 
[the] attorney and client only if the communications are based on confidential information 
provided by the client....”); Soriano v. Treasure Chest Casino, Inc. No. 95-3945, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19185, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 1996) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege between an 
attorney and a client protects communications only to the extent the communications may 
disclose confidential information provided by the client for the purpose of facilitating legal 
advice.”); Evans v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[If the client] sought the opinion 
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advice indicates nothing about any motives or information the client conveyed to the firm 
confidentially in connection with the investment advice.  Indeed, it appears that the law firm 
supplied the same advice to all its fee paying clients regardless of particular client circumstances.
In United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P.73 the district court for the northern 
district of Illinois applied the confidential communication exception in a similar manner to 
initially rule that Arthur Anderson (“Anderson”) could shield the identity of its clients from the 
Service.74 In this case, the Service sought to enforce a summons against Anderson requesting a 
list of all clients that undertook certain transactions for which the Service believed Anderson was 
required to maintain a list pursuant to the Code and regulations.75  In finding that the attorney-
client privilege76 applied to protect the names of the Anderson clients, the court, after reviewing 
certain documents in camera, stated:
Turning to the question whether revealing the clients’ identities 
would reveal their motives for seeking tax advice, we believe that 
the documents support the Intervenors’ position that it would. The 
IRS is seeking information, including the identities of the Poes and 
the Does, in an effort to determine whether or not Anderson was 
complying with the IRS regulations governing potentially abusive 
tax shelters. . . .  Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see 
how revealing the identities of the Poes and the Does could amount 
to anything less than a revelation of their motivations in seeking 
without disclosing any confidential information, the existence of the opinion and its contents are 
not privileged.”).
73 273 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Ill., 2003), amended, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14228 (N.D. Ill. 
August 15, 2003).
74 Id. The district court subsequently amended its original opinion and required Anderson 
to reveal the identity of its clients in light of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003) , cert. denied, .___ U.S. ___ (2004).  The BDO 
Seidman case is discussed in detail in Parts III.C.2 and IV.B.2., infra.
75 For a discussion of the list maintenance requirements and their interplay with the 
attorney-client privilege, see Parts IV.A.2. and B.2., infra.
76 While Anderson was an accounting firm not historically covered by the attorney-client 
privilege, section 7525 of the Code extends the common law attorney-client privilege to federally 
authorized tax practitioners for periods after July 22, 1998.  
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Andersen’s tax advice -- to invest in potentially abusive tax 
shelters. This motivation, the “very substantive reason that the 
client sought . . . advice in the first place,” is confidential and 
therefore privileged under section 7525. Cherney, 898 F.2d at 
568.77
Shortly after the district court issued its pro-taxpayer ruling in Arthur Anderson, 
the Seventh Circuit rejected applying the client-identity privilege to another similarly situated 
accounting firm in United States v. BDO Seidman (discussed below).78  In light of this opinion,
the district court reversed its prior decision and ordered Anderson to disclose the identities of its 
clients.79  However, in doing so the district court interpreted the Seventh Circuit ’s opinion as 
holding that the confidential communication exception could never apply to transactions 
governed by the investor list maintenance requirements of the Code and regulations.80
Consequently, the district court did not reverse its position regarding how the confidential 
communication exception would have applied if it were available in such situations.  Given the 
procedural posture of the BDO Seidman case and the fact that the case discusses alternative 
rationales for its decision, it is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit intended the case to be read 
as pronouncing an inflexible “no privilege” rule for transactions potentially subject to the Code’s 
listing requirements. Consequently, the following section will discuss how the Seventh Circuit 
applied the confidential communication exception in BDO Seidman.  The court’s alternative 
rationale based on the investor list requirements will be discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra.
77 Arthur Andersen, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60.
78 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, .___ U.S. ___ (2004).
79 United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14228 (N.D. Ill. August 
15, 2003).
80 Id. at *20 (“Thus, it appears that the Seventh Circuit intended in BDO to pronounce a 
generally applicable prohibition on the assertion of the identity privilege in IRS summons 
enforcement actions that does not seem altered by differing factual scenarios.”).
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[Note to editors: This discussion may need to be expanded if pro-taxpayer 
decisions are rendered in the pending Jenkins or Sidley cases (discussed infra) prior to 
publication.]
2. The Pro- Government Authority:  BDO Seidman
In United States v. BDO Seidman81 the Seventh Circuit examined substantially the 
same issue as in the Arthur Anderson case.  BDO Seidman (“BDO”), an accounting firm, advised 
a number of clients regarding certain transactions that the Service believed qualified as 
potentially abusive tax shelters covered by certain client list maintenance requirements under the 
Code and regulations.  In an effort to determine BDO’s compliance with obligations under these 
rules, the Service issued summonses requesting the client lists for twenty specified types of 
transactions.  Certain BDO clients intervened to prevent the disclosure of their identities 
asserting that such information was protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.82
The district court found that the clients’ identities would not be privileged and denied the motion 
to intervene.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for the 
limited purpose of making explicit factual findings regarding the nature of BDO’s relationship 
with the clients (e.g., was it tax advice, tax return preparation, or some other service being 
provided by BDO) and whether any privileged information was involved. In particular, one of 
the specified factual inquiries was “whether, in light of the purpose and history of BDO’s 
representation as well as the description of the transactions in the IRS summonses, revealing the 
appellants’ identifies to the IRS necessarily would reveal the appellants’ motive for seeking tax 
81 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, .___ U.S. ___ (2004).
82 As in the Arthur Anderson case, the attorney-client privilege was involved due to the 
application of section 7525 of the Code, which extends the attorney-client privilege to 
accountants providing tax advice after July 22, 1998.
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advice or the substance of that advice.”83 Through this limited remand, the Seventh Circuit 
essentially directed the district court to address the confidential communication exception as a 
factual matter.
In reviewing various documents in camera, the district court found that no 
identity privilege existed for most of the clients because (1) BDO was also representing them for 
tax return preparation purposes, or (2) the relevant engagement and consulting agreements 
specifically stated that BDO was not providing any legal or tax opinions to its clients.  Since the 
statutory version of the attorney-client privilege applicable to accountants only covers “tax 
advice,” the privilege would not extend to these clients.84  Since no documents were produced in 
respect of the remaining clients, the district court made no factual determinations regarding 
them.  
Considering the case in light of these factual findings, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s original conclusion that the BDO clients had not established a 
colorable claim for client-identity privilege, and therefore could not intervene.  In so doing it 
noted that the clients bore the burden of proving that a colorable claim existed.  The district 
court’s factual findings, together with the clients bearing the burden of proof, arguably could 
have disposed of the case without further elaboration.85  Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion discusses two distinct grounds for its conclusion.  First, the court found that disclosing 
the clients’ identities on these facts would not reveal any privileged information under the 
83 United States v. BDO Seidman, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 28092, *3 (7th Cir. Ill., Dec. 18, 
2002). 
84 I.R.C. § 7525.
85 That is, since the district court found that BDO was not providing tax advice to most of
the clients the section 7525 tax advice privilege would not apply.  Similarly, since no documents 
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confidential communication exception.  Second, the court noted that the existence of the 
Service’s client list maintenance requirements for the types of transactions involved removed any 
expectation of confidentiality (a prima facie requirement for applying the attorney -client 
privilege) the clients might otherwise have had.86
It is striking that the BDO Seidman court and the Arthur Anderson court could 
come to such opposite conclusions regarding the application of the confidential communication 
exception in two cases with such similar facts.  The Arthur Anderson court found that “it is 
difficult to see how revealing the identities of the [clients] could amount to anything less than a 
revelation of their motivations in seeking Andersen’s tax advice -- to invest in potentially 
abusive tax shelters.”87  The Seventh Circuit stated in BDO Seidman that “ [d]isclosure of the 
identities of the Does will disclose to the IRS that the Does participated in one of the 20 types of 
tax shelters described in its summonses.  It is less than clear, however, as to what motive, or 
other confidential communication of tax advice, can be inferred from that information alone.”88
Since the facts were substantially the same in both cases, the differences in result 
must be explained on other grounds.  The cynical view is that the courts here are simply taking 
advantage of the inherently factual nature of the confidential communication exception to reach 
different results in accord with their own personal biases.  However, as discussed in Part IV.B.3. 
below, this article maintains that the divergent results derive from the two courts applying 
different legal standards in analyzing the motive question under the confidential communication 
exception.  This article asserts that both Liebman and Arthur Anderson misconstrued the 
were provided for the remaining unidentified clients, it could be argued that they did not meet 
their burden of proof.
86 The court’s second rationale is discussed in Part IV.B.2., infra.
87 Arthur Andersen, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60.
-32-
relevance of the motive inquiry and therefore were wrongly decided.  Consequently, the 
confidential communication exception generally should not protect client identity in the context 
of tax planning advice. 
Under the status-as-client approach, however, both Liebman and Arthur Anderson
would be correctly decided, while the BDO Seidman decision would reach the wrong result.  The 
Service in these cases is essentially seeking the identity of clients solely for the purpose of 
linking them with the legal advice they received regarding specific transactions.  This is exactly 
the situation where the status-as-client approach maintains client identity should be protected
since seeking a client’s status as a client is likely to dissuade some potential clients from seeking 
legal advice.89 As discussed in part IV.C. below, however, this article argues that the status-as-
client approach reaches an incorrect conclusion when applied to tax planning situations.
IV. Applicability of Client-Identity Privilege in Tax Shelter and Tax Planning Situations
Now that the basics of the attorney-client privilege and the confidential 
communication exception have been covered both generally and as they apply in certain tax 
situations, an examination of the Service’s efforts to co-opt attorneys as part of its battle against 
abusive tax shelters can be undertaken.  Part IV.A. reviews the tax shelter industry and the 
relevant responses of the Service.  Part IV.B. argues that the attorney -client privilege should not 
protect client identity in tax shelter situations  and highlights the various arguments under current 
law supporting this view.  Part IV.C. presents a policy- based justification for generally denying 
the client-identity privilege in all tax planning situations.
88 BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d at 812 (emphasis added).
89 Indeed, in discussing Liebman in the context of the status-as-client approach Professor 
Goode goes so far as to declare that the result reached by the Third Circuit was “undoubtedly 
correct.”  Goode, supra note 15, at 332.
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A. Placing the Client Identity Debate in Context
Before analyzing whether the Service’s actions in attempting to force attorneys to 
reveal the identities of “naughty” clients engaging in potentially abusive tax motivated 
transactions are proper, it is necessary to briefly describe the nature of the tax shelter industry 
and the Service’s responses to it.
1. Tax Shelter Industry
The 1990’s saw a veritable explosion of tax shelter activity on behalf of 
corporations and high net worth individuals.90 While the revenue loss from this activity is hard 
to determine, the losses to the fisc have certainly been in tens of billions per year.91  While these 
transactions assumed a variety of forms and exploited many disparate provisions of the Code, 
90 See generally, Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX 
NOTES 1775 (1999); Treasury White Paper, supra note 3; Testimony of Stefan F. Tucker on 
Behalf of the Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of the U.S. House of Representatives on the Subject of the Revenue Provisions in 
President’s Fiscal Year 2000 Budget (Mar. 10, 1999), reprinted in 52 TAX LAW. 577 (1999); 
James P. Holden, 1999 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel:
Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 52 TAX LAW. 369 (1999); Janet 
Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X Rated Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 14, 1998 at 198; 
James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV.
135, 136 (2002); David Cay Johnston, Sham Shelters for Business Flourish as Scrutiny Fades, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1; David Cay Johnston, Big Accounting Firm’s Tax Plans Help 
the Wealthy Conceal Income, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A1; Tom Herman, Tax Report, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A1; Anita Raghavan & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Cat and Mouse: 
Wall Street Concocts New Tax-Saving Ploy; Then It’s Feds’ Turn, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1997, at 
A4.
91 See Bankman, supra note 90, at 1776.  In early 2000, the Commissioner of the Service 
stated that by closing down just a handful of identified tax-shelter structures, the projected 
revenue savings was almost $80 billion over ten years.  See Lawrence H. Summers, Summers 
Speech on Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 29, 2000, LEXIS 2000 TNT 40-34, 
at ¶ 8.  Also a recent study found that while corporate profits for the 250 largest U.S. companies 
rose by 23.5 percent from 1996 through 1998, federal corporate income tax revenues over the 
same period rose by only 7.7 percent.  See Robert S. McIntyre & T.D. Coo Nguyen, ITEP Report 
on Corporate Tax Avoidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 20, 2000, LEXIS 2000 TNT 204-25.
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they shared a number of common characteristics.92  In particular, such transactions normally 
were (1) developed by a promoter and actively marketed to clients, (2) used a supporting legal 
opinion describing the technical legal arguments for the favorable tax treatment, but (3) reached
a result so at odds with understood tax principles and policies that the position would certainly be 
challenged if discovered by the Service.  Consequently, a key – if sometimes unstated – element 
prompting the growth of such transactions was a cost-benefit analysis premised on the low risk 
of the Service actually discovering the transaction.93  Indeed, such transactions were often 
purposely structured to be highly complex so their purpose would not be immediately obvious to 
an examining agent, or were crafted in such a manner as to not be readily apparent on the face of 
the taxpayer’s tax return.94  This, coupled with the very low tax return audit rate in recent years,95
placed the Service at a severe disadvantage in challenging the legitimacy of such transactions.
2. Relevant Registration and Listing Requirements
The primary response by the Service and Congress to the tax shelter industry has 
been to increase the disclosure requirements for potentially abusive transactions so that the 
Service can more easily identify them and address any loopholes or uncertainties in the law that
92 See Bankman, supra note 90, at 1777; Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-
opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 49-50 (2001).
93 See Lavoie, supra note 92, at 53-55.
94 Minority Staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs Permanent Investigations 
Subcommittee, U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers and Financial 
Professionals, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 19, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 223-20, ¶ 40 [hereinafter 
Tax Shelter Industry]; Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 57 
TAX L. REV. __, ___ (forthcoming 2004) (noting that tax shelters often intentionally employ 
complex structures to “obfuscate” transactions).
95 The Service currently audits less than 0.6 percent of all income tax returns.  Pamela J. 
Gardiner, TIGTA Reviews IRS’s “Falling” Examination Rate, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 25, 
2002, LEXIS 2002 TNT 123–23.  Even audits of large corporate taxpayers declined 
“significantly” between 1997 and 2002.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE 
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promoters are exploiting with their transactions.96  These efforts have placed the Service in direct 
conflict with attorneys and accountants over the scope of the attorney-client privilege as it 
applies to these transactions and the identity of their clients.  This section describes the relevant 
disclosure provisions that are currently being applied to the tax shelter transactions.
The Service’s anti-tax shelter disclosure efforts have their genesis in three 
sections of the Code: Sections 6011, 6111, and 6112.  Section 6011 provides the Service with 
general authority to specify the information that must be supplied on federal tax returns.  Using 
this authority, the Service now requires that taxpayers affirmatively disclose “reportable 
transactions” on their yearly tax returns using Form 8886.  Sections 6111 and 6112 were 
originally enacted in 1984 to address a specific type of tax shelter activity prevalent in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s.  Section 6111 requires organizers of tax shelters to register the shelter with the 
Service.  However, the transactions specified as “tax shelters” for this purpose are fairly 
limited.97  Consequently, the Service has had little success in applying these registration 
requirements to tax shelters developed in recent years.  Section 6112 requires any “organizer” or 
“seller” of a “potentially abusive tax shelter” to maintain a list identifying all persons who 
acquired interests in the shelter together with “such other information as the Secretary may by 
regulations require.”  Such lists must be maintained for seven years and must be provided to the 
IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, 37 (JCX-53-03) (2003) [available at, 
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-53-03.pdf].
96 See Aggressive Actions, supra note 3.  However, given the current climate regarding 
statutory interpretation, it can be argued that increased disclosure and reactive changes in the law 
will be insufficient to curb tax shelter activity.  See, Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: 
The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 COLO. L. REV. 115, 152-54, 188 
(2004).
97 Generally section 6111 requires registration for (1) a narrow type of transaction used in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s and, after 1997 for (2) confidential corporate transactions that have a 
“significant purpose” of tax avoidance.  
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Service upon request.98  Significantly, the definition of a “potentially abusive tax shelter” is left 
almost entirely up to the Service’s discretion.  All that is required by statute is that the Service 
identify in its regulations the transaction as “having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.”  It 
is this broad grant of authority that the Service is primarily utilizing to force attorneys, 
accountants, and other promoters to identify clients participating in aggressive tax planning 
transactions.
The Service first issued expanded regulations under section 6112 in February of 
2000.99  These regulations have been modified several times in the last few years as the Service 
attempted to refine the types of transactions covered and the scope of the disclosure required.  
Consequently, this article will focus on the investor list regulations that are currently in effect.100
The final regulations require an investor list to be maintained for (1) any tax shelter subject to 
registration under section 6111 or (2) any “reportable transaction.”101
As a general matter, a reportable transaction is any transaction falling into any one 
of the following categories:
1. any transaction that is the same or “substantially similar”102
to any transaction identified by the Service as a tax 
avoidance transaction in its published guidance (a “listed 
transaction”); 
98 Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1. 
99 Treas. Dec. 8875, 65 Fed. Reg. 11211 (March 2, 2000).
100 See Treas. Dec. 9046, 68 Fed. Reg. 10161 (March 4, 2003), as amended by, Treas. Dec. 
9108, 68 Fed. Reg. 75128 (Dec. 30, 2003). 
101 Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1. 
102 For these purposes “substantially similar” is defined broadly to mean any transaction that 
is expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax consequences and is either factually similar 
or based on a similar tax strategy.  Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(d)(2), 1.6011-4(c)(4)  The 
regulations also indicate that the phrase is to be construed broadly in favor of disclosure.
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2. any transaction where an advisor receiving fees in excess of 
a threshold places limitations on the taxpayer’s disclosure 
of the tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction to 
protect the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax strategies (a 
“confidential transaction”);
3. any transaction where the taxpayer has the right to a partial 
refund of certain fees or such fees are contingent on the 
realization of tax benefits by the taxpayer (a “contractual 
protection transaction”);
4. any transactions generating tax losses in excess of certain 
thresholds for a single year or a combination of years (a 
“loss transaction”);
5. any transaction where the amount of income, gain, expense, 
or loss for federal tax purposes from the transaction differs 
by more than $10 million on a gross basis from the amount 
reportable for accounting purposes in any tax year (a 
“book-tax difference transaction”); or
6. any transaction resulting in the taxpayer claiming a tax 
credit exceeding $250,000 if the underlying asset giving 
rise to the credit is held by the taxpayer for 45 days or less 
(a “brief asset holding period transaction”).
While most commentators find these classifications of reportable transactions to 
be reasonable, the reach of who must maintain an investor list in respect of such transactions has 
given the practicing bar pause.103 While the statute imposes the listing obligation on any person 
who “organizes” or “sells” a specified transaction, the regulations define an organizer or seller 
for these purposes to include any “material advisor.” In general, a person is a material adviser if 
she will receive at least a minimum fee104 and makes a “tax statement” regarding the transaction 
103 See, e.g., Steven M. Rosenthal and Jeanne K. Falstrom, Me, A Material Adviser? What 
Now?, 98 TAX NOTES 1749 (Mar. 17, 2003); Steven K. Hazen & Nancy H. Wojtas, California 
Bar Attorneys Comment on Tax Shelter Reporting, List Maintenance Rules, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Jan. 21, 2004, LEXIS 2004 TNT 13-37.
104 The minimum fee varies depending on the type of person and reportable transaction 
involved.  For a listed transaction the minimum fee is $25,000 if solely corporate taxpayers are 
involved and $10,000 otherwise.  For all other types of reportable transactions the minimum fee 
is $250,000 if solely corporate taxpayers are involved and $50,000 otherwise.  For these 
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to (or for the benefit of) a person participating in a reportable transaction.105  A tax statement is 
any statement, written or oral, that relates to the tax aspect of a transaction that causes the 
transaction to be a reportable transaction.106  As a result of this definition, most attorneys 
advising on the taxation of a reportable transaction would be material advisors required to 
maintain investor lists.107
Finally, the regulations specify a wide variety of information that must be 
maintained as part of the investor list.  In addition to the normal information that would be 
expected (e.g., the investor’s name, address, date of transaction and amount invested), the 
regulations require the material advisor to provide information regarding the structure and 
anticipated tax effect of the transaction, including:
1. a detailed description of each transaction that describes 
both the tax structure and its expected tax treatment;
2. a summary or schedule of the tax treatment that each 
person is intended or expected to derive from participation 
in each transaction, if known by the material adviser; and
3. copies of any written materials, including tax analyses or 
opinions, relating to each transaction that are material to an 
understanding of the purported tax treatment or tax 
structure of the transaction that have been shown or 
provided to any person who acquired or might have
acquired an interest in the transactions, or to their 
representatives, tax advisers, or agents, by the material 
adviser.
purposes all fees paid for any effectuating the transaction or providing other services or advice 
(whether or not tax advice) are included. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(3)(iii).
105 Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(3)(iii).
106 Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(2)(i).
107 However, the regulations make clear that an advisor consulted after the purported benefit 
of the reportable transaction has already been reflected on a taxpayer’s tax return would not be 
required to maintain an investor list.  Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(2)(iv).
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Further, the Service maintains that when it requests a copy of the list an attorney 
can only assert the attorney-client privilege for information in the third  category listed above.108
Consequently, under the regulations the Service is essentially asserting that for reportable 
transactions a client’s identity, as well as the structure and intended tax effect of the transaction 
actually entered into, can never be protected under the attorney-client privilege.
3. Pending Identity Privilege Cases and Possible Legislation
The Service’s promulgation of these detailed investor list maintenance 
requirements were intended to provide a trail to potentially abusive transactions and the 
particular taxpayers engaging in them.  However, these rules are only effective if promoters and 
taxpayers comply with their disclosure obligations.  In point of fact, the promoters of tax shelter 
transactions have gone to great lengths to avoid complying with their reporting obligations under 
these rules.109  Indeed, in one documented case an employee at a major accounting firm 
affirmatively advocated that the firm willfully ignore its reporting obligations based on a cost-
benefit analysis showing that the profits from marketing the transaction would far outweigh any 
penalties owed if the non-reporting were discovered.110 As a result of what appears to have been 
widespread planning to avoid, or in some cases knowingly disregard, these listing and disclosure 
requirements, the Service began formal compliance audits of suspected promoters and began 
legal action to obtain client names in early 2002.111 The BDO Seidman and Arthur Anderson
cases arose out of attempts by the Service to enforce summonses requesting information 
108 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(g)(2); Treas. Dec. 9046, 68 Fed. Reg. 10161, 10163 
(March 4, 2003) (“This change reflects the IRS and Treasury Department’s belief that the other 
information covered by these regulations is not privileged.”).
109 Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 94, at ¶ 38-43, 257-80.
110 Id. at ¶ 39.
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regarding allegedly reportable transactions issued in such compliance audits.  At the same time,
the Service also began compliance audits of several law firms.  Two of these law firms (Jenkins 
& Gilchrest and Sidley, Austin, Brown &Wood) have refused to respond to summonses 
requesting the names of clients who consummated particular types of transactions by asserting
that such information is protected by the attorney-client privilege.112 While both these cases are
pending in Illinois district courts, and therefore the Seventh Circuit’s decision in BDO Seidman
would be controlling precedent, the law firms maintain that their cases are different based both 
on the facts and because a law firm is involved rather than an accounting firm.  
Finally, in its 2005 budget proposals the Bush Administration has suggested 
legislation to “clarify” that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the tax practitioner privilege 
under section 7525 apply to protect a client’s identity from disclosure under the section 6112 
investor list maintenance requirement.113  It is currently unclear whether this proposal ultimately 
will be enacted by Congress.
111 Aggressive Actions, supra note 3, at ¶ 6. Indeed, in a prior article I advocated that the 
Service undertake just such compliance audits as a means of uncovering abusive transactions and 
providing an appropriate audit trail for the Service.  Lavoie, supra note 92, at 87-88.
112 DOJ Files Petition to Enforce Summonses Issued to Jenkens & Gilchrist, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Aug. 15, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 158-4 [hereinafter Jenkens Petition]; Justice Petitions 
to Enforce John Doe Summons Against Sidley Austin, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 2, 2004, LEXIS 
2004 TNT 1-15 [hereinafter Sidley Petition].
113 Neither section 6112 nor its legislative history specifically refer to the attorney-client 
privilege or how it might apply to an attorney required to maintain an investor list.  The 
legislative history to section 6111, adopted at the same time as 6112, acknowledges that while 
attorneys would not normally be “organizers” of transactions for purposes of that provision, the 
Service has authority to treat them as organizers in appropriate cases.  JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE 
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 477 (Comm. Print 1984).  Consequently, it is likely that 
Congress contemplated that the Service might require attorneys to maintain investor lists under 
section 6112 in some situations.  However, in the absence of an explicit indication from 
Congress that the attorney-client privilege was to be superceded, the normal presumption would 
be that the privilege rules would continue to apply despite the fact that attorneys might generally 
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B. Attorney-Client Privilege Does Not Shield Identity in Tax Shelter Transactions
The prior discussion has outlined the basics of the attorney-client privilege and 
how the confidential communication exception has been applied in the client identity context.  
This section demonstrates that the client-identity privilege is unlikely to apply in tax shelter 
situations.  In particular, at least one of the alternative rationales discussed below is likely to 
foreclose the application of the privilege.
1. Attorney Acting in Promoter Role
Client identity is normally not protected by the attorney-client privilege because 
the required conditions for applying the privilege are simply not present when identity itself is at 
issue.  As we have seen, to make out a prima facie case for the privilege (1) a client (2) must 
have communicated, for the purpose of (3) seeking legal advice, (4) confidentially (5 ) with a 
lawyer in her attorney capacity.114  In the case of client identity, the argument can be made that a 
number of these prerequisites are not satisfied.  For instance, it is sometimes maintained that 
since a client’s identity is usually conveyed to the attorney as an introductory matter before the 
legal consultation begins, it is not conveyed confidentially nor is it conveyed to the attorney in 
her legal capacity since the attorney-client relationship has arguably not yet been formed when 
the information is conveyed.115  On a related theme, it can be asserted that the client’s name is 
be covered by the provision.  This is similar to the situation under section 6050I (which was also 
enacted in 1984) where attorneys have an obligation to report large cash transactions, but where 
the courts nevertheless have still found it necessary to analyze whether the attorney-client 
privilege might be applicable before requiring disclosure.  See Part III.A., supra.
114 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292, at 554.
115 See sources cited in note 26, supra.
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not communicated to the attorney in confidence because either the client is already known to the 
attorney or the identity will likely become know at some point in the representation.116
While such arguments are frequently criticized by commentators, they 
nevertheless appear to form the basis for the accepted position that, absent unusual 
circumstances, client identity is not covered by the attorney-client privilege.117  However, as we 
have seen, while client identity may not be privileged in its own right under the traditional 
formulation of the attorney-client privilege, the confidential communication exception can 
override this conclusion if revealing a client’s name would derivatively reveal some other 
confidential communication covered by the privilege.  Consequently, by themselves, none of 
these arguments could result in a conclusive determination that a particular client’s identity is not 
privileged.  
On the other hand, a conclusive determination could be reached in situations 
where it is shown that an attorney is acting in a non-legal capacity.  In such circumstances 
neither the prima facie case nor the confidential communication exception can be satisfied 
because none of the communications between the attorney and the client would be eligible for 
protection.  No true attorney-client relationship exists if the nature of their consultations are non-
legal.  
In a tax shelter situation, an attorney may be acting essentially as a promoter 
selling “cookie cutter” tax saving strategies to clients.118 As a result, attorneys actively engaging 
116 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2313, at 609
117 See, e.g., Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 28, at 1077-78. 
118 See, Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 94, at ¶ 12 (“[T]he industry focus has expanded to 
developing a steady supply of generic “tax products” that can be aggressively marketed to 
multiple clients. In short, the tax shelter industry has moved from providing one-on- one tax 
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in tax shelter promotion may be particularly vulnerable to claims that no privilege exists for any 
communications associated with these transactions.  Indeed, in its two pending enforcement 
actions against law firms the Service has stressed the promoter role of the firms.119 These law 
firms can be expected to deny promoter classification.120  Alternatively, they can argue that even 
if some element of their relationship with clients was non-legal in nature, the fact that legal 
opinions were rendered to clients indicates that a legal relationship existed that could give rise to 
confidential communications covered by the privilege.  
The main area where the courts have struggled with how the attorney-client 
privilege applies to mixed purpose relationships is in the context of in-house counsel, where
business and legal advice are often mixed.121  The general rule arising out of this case law is that 
for the privilege to apply to a communication the “advice given must be predominantly legal, as 
opposed to business, in nature.”122
advice in response to tax inquiries to also initiating, designing, and mass marketing tax shelter 
products.”).  Indeed, in extreme cases where the attorney provides only a “canned” opinion to a 
client that is based on a hypothetical fact pattern, rather than specific facts communicated by the 
client, it could be legitimately argued that there are simply no client confidential communications 
that exist to be protected even if a true attorney-client relationship exists. See sources cited in 
note 72, supra.
119 See Jenkens Petition, supra note 112; Sidley Petition, supra note 112.
120 See, e.g., William P. Durbin, Jenkens & Gilchrist Accuses Government Of ‘End Run’
Around Client Confidentiality Principle, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 15, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 
158-22.
121 See generally, Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing 
Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169 (1997) and the cases cited therein.
122 Itoba, Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 43 (D. Conn. 1996).  See also Sedco 
Int’l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982)
(“primarily legal advice”); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 697 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“primarily 
for the purpose of generating legal advice”) (quoting McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 
234, 238 (N.D. Cal. 1990)); Pippenger v. Gruppe, 883 F Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D. Ind. 1994)
(communications “primarily for the purpose of securing legal opinions and legal services”) 
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While it might seem easy for an outside law firm advising a client on tax matters 
to prove that their role was predominately legal (e.g., the structuring of a transaction in light of 
tax considerations), a district court for the western district of North Carolina has found that the 
attorney-client privilege did not apply in a tax shelter context to a law firm acting as a promoter.  
In John Doe v. Wachovia Corp.,123 the Service was investigating certain alleged tax shelter 
transactions advised on by the law firm of Jenkens & Gilchrist (“Jenkens”) and the accounting 
firm KPMG.  As part of its investigation the Service attempted to obtain client list information 
from Jenkens and KPMG, but encountered delays in obtaining the information due to assertions 
of privilege.124  Consequently, the Service requested that Wachovia, a large financial institution 
that facilitated these transactions for Jenkens and KPMG clients, provide information regarding 
the clients who consummated the subject transactions.125  Wachovia determined that it legally 
needed to comply with the Service’s request.  Several unidentified clients then sued Wachovia to 
enjoin it from disclosing their identities.126  The various plaintiffs maintained either that (1) 
Wachovia had communicated confidential information to Jenkens and KPMG on their behalf and 
that forcing Wachovia to reveal their identities would reveal communications covered by the 
attorney-client privilege127 or (2) that they had conveyed confidential information to Jenkens 
(quoting United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall 
Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)(“primary purpose of the communication”).
123 268 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
124 See Sheryl Stratton, Privilege Sidelines Shelter Actions, Gov’t Changes Tack,100 TAX 
NOTES 295 (July 21, 2003) (“A year after the IRS began taking shelter promoters to court, the 
summons enforcement actions are bogged down in litigation over privilege issues.”). 
125 Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
126 As a result, the case has a somewhat unusual procedural posture in that neither the 
Service nor Jenkens were actual parties to the suit.
127 Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
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who then retained Wachovia and shared the information with it as part of facilitating the 
transactions.128
Rather than engage in an examination of the underlying communications involved 
to determine whether the confidential communication exception applied, the district court 
concluded that the relationship between the unidentified clients and KPMG and Jenkens simply 
did not indicate the existence of any attorney-client relationship to which the privilege could 
obtain.129  After detailing its examination of the various retention agreements between the 
parties, the court concluded:
J&G with whom [Plaintiffs] claim an attorney-client relationship, 
appears to have merely sold a package to them which contained a 
description of the transaction and a memorandum as to the 
potential tax consequences stemming from the transaction. The 
“Executive Summary” of the transaction contains a general 
description of how to structure such a transaction; there is nothing 
uniquely tied to the individual taxpayer’s financial situation. 
Indeed, no financial information pertaining to any taxpayer has 
been inserted into the formula. Nor is there any evidence that any 
individual taxpayer ever had so much as a conversation with an 
attorney at J&G. . . .
Indeed, the same description and opinion memorandum was 
distributed throughout the country to taxpayers. Moreover, it was 
delivered, not by J&G, but by Wachovia. “The attorney-client 
privilege is not intended to permit ‘an attorney to conduct his 
client’s business affairs in secret.’” [In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 
204 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2000)] (quoting In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986)). And, ‘a 
client may not “buy”  a privilege by retaining an attorney to do 
something that a non-lawyer could do just as well.’” Id., at 523
(quoting Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 698 (7th Ed. 1998)). 
Indeed, in this case there is no evidence that J&G was (1) retained 
by the client, as opposed to by Wachovia; (2) contacted by the 
client, except through Wachovia; (3) providing legal advice based 
128 Id. at 630.
129 Id. at 633 (“[T]he issue is whether [the Plaintiffs] had an attorney-client relationship with 
J&G. The Court cannot conclude that such a relationship existed.”).
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on individual financial information, as opposed to selling a tax 
advantaged structure; and (4) by the terms of its own agreement, 
acting as an attorney for the “client.” The Court finds that the 
taxpayers cannot manipulate the privilege in such a manner.130
The court’s position seems to have been influenced at least in part by language in 
the retention agreements that required the clients to keep the tax strategies presented to them 
confidential for the benefit of Jenkens in protecting these proprietary transactions, a fact clearly 
not indicative of a normal attorney-client relationship.  While the facts described by the 
Wachovia court are somewhat extreme (e.g. the issuance of “cookie cutter” opinions without any 
client specific facts or even evidence that the clients spoke with the Jenkens attorneys), the 
marketing of tax shelters has become such a lucrative business for certain law firms that such 
apparently extreme facts may turn out to be somewhat common.  Even in less extreme situations, 
it is possible to see how a court could find that the predominate purpose of the relationship 
between a client and a promoting attorney would be a non-legal one.
Courts could also reach the opposite conclusion though.  For instance, in Liebman
the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that the client-identity privilege would not 
apply if the attorney was also acting in a non-legal capacity.  In that case the Service maintained 
that the law firm was acting as a broker in selling tax advantaged partnerships and therefore the 
attorney-client privilege could not apply to the identity of the clients.  The Third Circuit rejected 
this contention on the ground that even if a non-legal relationship also existed, that would not
foreclose asserting the privilege for the law firm’s legal conclusion that fees paid by clients were 
130 Id. at 634-35.
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deductible.131  However, the Liebman court’s authority for this position (NLRB v. Harvey132) is 
unpersuasive.  
In Harvey an attorney hired a detective at an unidentified client’s request to 
follow a union organizer.  When several employees of a local company were fired after speaking 
with this organizer, the National Labor Relations Board began an investigation and ordered the 
attorney to reveal his client.  The Fourth Circuit noted that merely using an attorney to hire a 
detective as a means to shield the activity from scrutiny would be an improper use of the 
attorney-client privilege.  In remanding back to the district court for purposes of holding a 
detailed evidentiary hearing on the question, the court directed:  
If the District Judge finds from the nature and character of 
Harvey’s employment that Harvey was retained by his client to 
render a legal opinion, perform a legal service or afford 
representation in legal proceedings and as an incident to this 
employment he hired the detective, the privilege should be 
recognized.  On the contrary, if Harvey was engaged to obtain 
information for his client without being retained to furnish a legal 
opinion, services or representation, in connection with the request 
for information, the privilege does not exist and he must disclose 
the name of his client and comply with the subpoena.133
The language of the Harvey court indicates that the client’s identity would be 
privileged if the non-legal services were incidental to the legal employment.  This accords with 
the predominate purpose approach which generally governs whether particular communications 
are protected by the attorney-client privilege in mixed motive situations.134  Consequently, to 
read Harvey as announcing a categorical rule that client identity is privileged as long as any legal 
services are undertaken, as the Liebman decision does, seems questionable.
131 Liebman, 742 F.2d at 810 n.3.
132 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
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In any event, it is clear that many situations exist where an attorney will advise a 
client regarding a reportable transaction without acting predominately as a promoter.  
Consequently, other rationales would be necessary to overcome a claim of identity privilege in 
such less extreme cases.
2. No Reasonable Expectation of Confidentiality
In order to establish a prima facie case for the attorney-client privilege it is 
necessary to show that the client expected his communications to be confidential.135
Consequently, if taxpayers lack a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding tax shelter 
transactions, then there would be no privilege for their identity, the fact that they sought legal 
advice, or the nature of the tax shelter transaction.  In light of the disclosure and investor list 
maintenance rules embodied in the Code and regulations, there is a strong argument that 
taxpayers cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy for transactions likely to be covered by 
those rules.  
Before turning to the impact of the list maintenance regulations, it is helpful to 
consider whether the fact that the taxpayer engages in a tax shelter is itself confidential 
information.  Under the self-assessment tax system used in the United States, it is the taxpayer 
who must determine how the law applies to her circumstances and then she must report the 
positions taken to the Service by filing an annual tax return.  Consequently, taxpayers understand 
that they must report their transactions and the claimed tax treatment (whether aggressive or not) 
133 Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
134 See note 122, supra.
135 See, e.g., McDonald v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc., No. C80-1295A, 1982 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14662, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 1982) (“The privilege does not attach unless the 
information and documents involved were intended as confidential communication at the time 
they were made.”). 
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to the Service.  Thus, the fact that a transaction is undertaken, and the tax consequences the 
taxpayer believes flow from it, are never matters that a taxpayer would expect to be confidential
from the Service.
However, the mere fact that the underlying information is not confidential is 
generally not sufficient to reject an application of the attorney-client privilege.136  By its nature 
the attorney-client privilege does not protect facts from discovery.  Rather, it protects a client and 
his counsel from being forced to reveal that those facts were communicated to his attorney.137
Thus, if a client saw Mr. X commit a crime and discusses the legal consequences of being an 
eyewitness to the crime with his attorney, the client cannot refuse to testify about Mr. X’s actions 
by asserting the attorney-client privilege.  However, the client can prevent his attorney from 
revealing that the client communicated his knowledge of Mr. X’s actions to the attorney.  
Consequently, the relevant question in determining whether the client’s confidential 
communication is privileged is whether the client legitimately expected that the attorney could 
not be forced to disclose that communication.
When a tax shelter is involved, answering that question requires an analysis of the 
impact of the disclosure rules under section 6112.  If these rules, as implemented by the 
Service’s regulations, remove any legitimate taxpayer expectation that an attorney would be able 
to keep the client’s identity and the nature of the tax shelter transaction confidential from the 
136 Some courts have, however, misinterpreted the scope of the attorney-client privilege and 
found no privilege for the communication of non-confidential information.  See generally, Paul 
R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney Communications, 
Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, And The Source Of The Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U.L. 
REV. 967, 979 n. 53 (1999) (listing cases where courts have misapplied the attorney-client 
privilege in this context).
137 Id. at 970 (“The basic privilege only protects client communications with the attorney; 
the privilege does not protect the underlying facts in these communications.”).
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Service, then no privilege can apply.138  The Seventh Circuit, after an examination of the 
legislative history of section 6112 and the general policy of disclosure underlying the self-
assessment tax system, has concluded that taxpayers in this situation generally cannot form a 
legitimate expectation of confidentiality.
[T]he Does’ participation in potentially abusive tax shelters is 
information ordinarily subject to full disclosure under the federal 
tax law. Congress has determined that tax shelters are subject to 
special scrutiny, and anyone who organizes or sells an interest in 
tax shelters is required, pursuant to I.R.C. section 6112, to 
maintain a list identifying each person to whom such an interest 
was sold. This list-keeping provision precludes the Does from 
establishing an expectation of confidentiality in their 
communications with BDO, an essential element of the attorney-
client privilege and, by extension, the section 7525 privilege. At 
the time that the Does communicated their interest in participating 
in tax shelters that BDO organized or sold, the Does should have 
known that BDO was obligated to disclose the identity of clients 
engaging in such financial transactions. Because the Does cannot 
credibly argue that they expected that their participation in such 
transactions would not be disclosed, they cannot now establish that 
the documents responsive to the summonses, which do not contain 
any tax advice, reveal a confidential communication.139
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling is especially sweeping in light of the underlying 
factual background.  Here, the relevant pleadings make clear that BDO maintained that many of 
the transactions were not reportable transactions subject to the investor list maintenance rules.140
138 Note that this argument does not require a finding that Congress intended section 6112 to 
supercede the attorney-client privilege.  The premise of the argument here is that in light of the 
section 6112 regulations and the general requirement of taxpayer disclosure in our self-
assessment tax system, taxpayers should have anticipated that attorneys could be forced to 
divulge information about reportable transactions and the clients involved in them.  
Consequently, while the attorney-client privilege is still potentially available despite the 
enactment of section 6112, the reality of how the Service has implemented that provision would 
normally negate a crucial element (i.e., the expectation of confidentiality) that a taxpayer would 
need to prove for the privilege to apply. 
139 BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d at 812 (citations omitted).
140 See, e.g., IRS Agent Declaration In Support Of Justice Department BDO Seidman 
Enforcement Actions, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 16, 2002, LEXIS 2002 TNT 136-7.
-51-
As a result, BDO presumably advised clients that it would not maintain a list and that the clients 
would not have to disclose the transactions on their own tax returns pursuant to section 6011 as 
reportable transactions.  Indeed, actively avoiding the list maintenance requirements was 
essentially an industry pre-requisite for any promoted tax shelter transaction since clients would 
be reluctant to engage in transactions requiring explicit taxpayer and promoter disclosure.141
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit essentially held that even taxpayers who were advised that 
their transactions would not be covered by the listing rules still could not form a legitimate 
expectation of confidentiality.  Presumably this sweeping conclusion is attributable to the broad 
reach of the section 6112 regulations, which can cause tax motivated transactions to retroactively 
become reportable transactions.142
3. No Privileged Client Communication is Revealed by Identifying Clients
Assuming that, despite the forgoing arguments, a taxpayer can establish a prima 
facie case for applying the attorney-client privilege to tax shelter transaction, it is necessary to 
evaluate whether the confidential communication exception will protect the taxpayer’s identity.  
While the outcome under the confidential communication exception often appears driven by an 
ex post evaluation of the relevant facts, the nature of the attorney-client relationship in tax 
planning situations is such that the specific factual background becomes less important.
Essentially, when tax planning is involved there are very few instances where revealing a client’s 
identity would reveal a motive actually eligible for protection under the attorney-client privilege.
141 See, Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 94, at ¶ 39.
142 In particular, the regulations require investor lists to be maintained for transactions that 
are “expected” to be reportable transactions and also applies retroactively to transactions that the 
Service eventually identifies as “listed transactions” in published guidance even if they would 
not have qualified as reportable transactions when originally entered into. Treas. Reg. § 
301.6112-1(c)(2)(i)(A)-(B) and (b)(2)(iii).
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The reason for this requires taking a closer examination of the proper legal standard involved in 
applying the confidential communication exception.
As commonly phrased, the confidential communication exception protects a 
client’s identity when revealing that identity would reveal the client’s motive for seeking legal 
advice.  This formulation implicitly assumes that a client’s motive in seeking advice is a 
confidential communication worthy of protection by the privilege.  However, there are situations 
where merely knowing a client’s motive in seeking legal advice does not reveal any confidential 
communication that should be protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Consequently, this 
article asserts that under the confidential communication exception, the fact that a client’s motive 
in seeking legal advice would be revealed should only be the first step in the analysis.  To 
properly effectuate the purpose of the confidential communication exception, a court must also 
determine that such revealed motive in fact represents a confidential communication protected by 
the attorney-client privilege.  This two step approach to analyzing motive when applying the 
confidential communication exception will be referred to as the “confidential motive 
requirement.”
The confidential motive requirement can be used to explain the divergent results 
in the BDO Seidman, Arthur Anderson and Liebman cases.  Liebman and Arthur Anderson were 
focused narrowly on whether any motive would be revealed (e.g., a motive of aggressive tax 
planning), and upon finding such a motive these courts applied the client-identity privilege.  The 
court in BDO Seidman appears to have gone further and questioned the relevance of the 
allegedly disclosed motive.  While the court was not explicit in enunciating its logic, the 
language of the BDO Seidman opinion can be read as acknowledging the confidential motive 
requirement.  In particular, the Seventh Circuit stated:
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[T]he Does submit that the IRS’ summonses set forth such detailed 
descriptions about suspect types of tax shelters under investigation 
that any document produced in response that also reveals a client’s 
identity will inevitably reveal that client’s motivation for seeking 
tax advice from BDO. The Does define their “motive” for 
retaining BDO’s services as the “desire to engage in financial 
transactions which the government might later decide to be 
questionable, or . . . ‘potentially abusive.’”  Appellants’ Br. at 16. 
Because a client’s “motive” for seeking legal advice is considered 
a confidential communication, the Does contend that the section 
7525 privilege should protect against the disclosure of their motive 
for seeking tax advice, a motive that would be known if their 
identities are revealed. 
The Does have not established that a confidential communication
will be disclosed if their identities are revealed in response to the 
summonses. Disclosure of the identities of the Does will disclose 
to the IRS that the Does participated in one of the 20 types of tax 
shelters described in its summonses. It is less than clear, however, 
as to what motive, or other confidential communication of tax 
advice, can be inferred from that information alone. Compared to 
the situations in the Tillotson and Cherney cases, where the 
Government already knew much about the substance of the 
communications between the attorney and his unidentified client, 
in this case the IRS knows relatively little about the interactions 
between BDO and the Does, the nature of their relationship, or the 
substance of their conversations.143
This passage makes clear that the court understands that revealing the identities of 
BDO’s clients will directly link them with particular transactions which the Service has 
identified as aggressive tax motivated transactions.  The court also notes that the clients assert 
that engaging in such aggressive transactions constituted their motive in seeking BDO’s advice.  
Nevertheless, the court finds that it is not clear that any confidential motive or advice protected 
by the attorney-client privilege would be disclosed by revealing the client’s identities.  The court 
is essentially indicating that the “motive” asserted by BDO’s clients is not a confidential motive 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  The fact that the court places quotation marks around 
the term “motive” in discussing the position of the BDO clients further emphases this point.
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Similarly, by focusing on the relationship between the clients and the accounting 
firm the court is suggesting in this quotation that the mere disclosure of the existence of a tax 
planning relationship is not enough to invoke the confidential communication exception.  There 
must be something more that ties the existence of the relationship to some confidential 
communication revealed within it.  This need for some additional fact to link the clients’
identities to a confidential communication is highlighted by the court’s reference to Cherney and 
Tillotson.  Both Cherney and Tillotson144 involved situations where an action outside the mere 
fact of representation was relevant to finding that a confidential communication would be 
revealed.  Thus in Cherney it was known that the unidentified client paid for the representation 
of a defendant in a drug conspiracy case and that the attorney acknowledged the client also 
consulted about his own involvement in the conspiracy.  Revealing the client’s name would have 
revealed the client’s motive in seeking legal advice (i.e., to get advice about his participation in 
the conspiracy), but this motive was itself confidential because it implicitly revealed the client’s 
confidential admission to his attorney of actual involvement in the conspiracy.  Similarly, in 
Tillotson the government was aware that a check for previously unpaid taxes had been delivered.  
In light of that fact, revealing the unidentified client would have revealed his motive for seeking 
legal counsel (i.e., to get advice about past tax underpayments), but the motive was itself 
confidential because revealing it would implicitly disclose the client’s confidential admission to 
his attorney of the past tax underpayments.  
In BDO Seidman, however, revealing that a client sought tax planning advice and 
executed a transaction based on advice that the transaction would achieve a certain tax result
143 BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d at 812 (emphasis added). 
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does not reveal any privileged confidential communication from the client to the tax advisor.  
Taxes are such an important aspect of all transactions in the United States that it is fair to say 
almost no large or intricate transaction should be consummated without tax advice.145  Nor is 
there anything nefarious that can be inferred from someone seeking tax planning advice in 
structuring their affairs, no matter how aggressive, as long as it is permissible under the law.146
Under the confidential communication exception motive is only relevant to the extent that the 
confidential motive requirement is satisfied.  This generally will require some additional fact to 
be know that, when linked with motive, amounts to the revelation of a confidential 
communication.  Without some additional facts known by the Service that would reveal a 
144 Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965).  Tillotson is an anonymous 
payment case decided by the Seventh Circuit with facts and conclusions virtually identical to the 
Baird decision discussed in Part III.B., supra.
145 See, e.g., Bruce Kayle, The Tax Adviser’s Privilege in Transactional Matters: A Synopsis 
and a Suggestion, 54 TAX LAW. 509, 551 (2001) (“[T]ax law is far more pervasive than any 
other area of law in the sense that it necessarily will affect virtually every individual and business 
enterprise in the country.”); Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U.L. 
REV. 359, 360 (1995) (“Tax law touches almost every aspect of human conduct.”); Kyle D. 
Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government 
Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1151-52 (1996) (“[I]t might be argued that, because 
every aspect of the tax laws affects taxpayers’ incentives to some extent, all tax laws can be 
characterized plausibly as subsidies.”); Richard Lavoie, A World of Taxpayers? It’s Not a Small 
World After All, 70 UMKC L. REV. 545, 546 (2002) (“U.S. persons have become accustomed to 
the omnipresent nature of our tax laws”); Robert Gatter, Human Subjects Research and Conflicts 
of Interest: Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: The Challenge of Regulating 
Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327, 387 (2003) (“[The Internal Revenue Code] 
attempts to direct how taxpayers should account for every aspect of their economic lives.”).
146 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 
(1935) (“Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not 
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty 
to increase one’s taxes.”); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a 
taxpayer to decrease the amount of what would otherwise be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, 
by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”); Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-
51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting opinion) (“Over and over again courts have said that there 
is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible.  Everybody 
does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law 
demands: taxes are enforced extractions, not voluntary contributions.”).  
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confidential individualized motive or communication between the client and advisor, there would 
be no basis for protecting the client’s identity in a tax planning situation.147  A client’s identity 
should only be privileged if revealing it would disclose a motive that is itself a privileged 
confidential communication.  A general motive to explore means of legal tax planning is not 
such a confidential communication, and therefore there is no basis to find the client’s identity to 
be privileged under the confidential motive requirement.
Using the confidential motive requirement, most tax planning transactions would 
not be eligible for the confidential communication exception.  If revealing a client’s identity only 
reveals that the client consummated a particular transaction and that the client was advised that 
the transaction would have a certain tax effect, then the only inference of motive that could be 
drawn is that the client wished to engage in legal tax planning.  The communication of this 
motive to an attorney should not be viewed as either confidential or legally relevant to any tax 
issue discussed with an attorney.148  Without some other piece of information being known to the 
government, revealing the client’s identity in a tax planning context discloses no confidential
client communication and should not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
147 This is not to say that such a showing could never be made in a tax planning context.  For 
instance, if the Service knew other facts which, when linked with the taxpayers seeking planning 
advice, revealed an actual confidential communication (e.g., a subjective state of mind unique to 
the client, like statements acknowledging that a transaction lacked a business purpose or that the 
taxpayer was undertaking the transaction solely on the basis that it was unlikely to be detected on 
audit), then it would be possible for the privilege to apply.  However, such situations are likely to 
be exceeding rare.
148 While a client’s subjective state of mind will sometimes be relevant in resolving a 
substantive tax question (e.g., whether a good faith belief existed that a position was supportable, 
or whether a taxpayer willfully disregarding an accepted tax rule), subjective intent is not 
relevant to the resolution of most tax issues.  Additionally, even where a taxpayer’s intentions 
are relevant, a generalized motive to structure transactions so as to pay the minimum amount of 
tax permissible under the law is never a proscribed state of mind that would be relevant to 
resolving any tax issue.
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On the other hand, in rare circumstances the confidential motive requirement 
might be satisfied even when an attorney is retained for tax planning advice.  Assume for 
instance that Sam, an individual taxpayer, retains Linda, a tax attorney, to obtain advice on a 
proposed tax shelter transaction that a promoter has brought to Sam’s attention.  Linda’s initial 
advice is that the transaction in not likely to achieve the tax results claimed by the promoter.  
Nevertheless, Sam decides to consummate the transaction and directs Linda to draft the legal 
documents necessary to implement the transaction.  If the Service later learns that one of Linda’s 
clients executed this transaction and it also knows that she advised against the transaction, then 
forcing her to reveal Sam’s identity might well reveal a confidential client communication.  
Here, the Service knows more than just the nature of the transaction and that it was 
consummated.  Knowing the additional fact that the transaction was undertaken against the 
advice of counsel might be relevant in proving Sam’s state of mind if the Service asserted a 
penalty in connection with the transaction.  Consequently, in this example the additional facts 
known by the Service about the substance of Linda’s advice could support a conclusion that 
revealing Sam’s identity would reveal a privileged confidential communication between Sam 
and Linda. Consequently, the confidential communication exception could apply since the 
confidential motive requirement would be satisfied.  Nevertheless, such situations are likely to be 
quite rare.
Interpreting the confidential communication exception as including the 
confidential motive requirement would not alter the results in anonymous payment cases like 
Baird and Tillotson.  In such cases, the additional fact that cash was paid to the Service would 
support the conclusion that revealing the client’s identity would be tantamount to revealing a
confidential admission of past improper behavior by the unidentified client.  Similarly, the 
-58-
confidential motive requirement would not force a client’s identity to be revealed in non-
planning tax situations.  When a taxpayer seeks legal advice regarding already consummated and 
reported transactions, it is likely that the mere act of consultation could create an inference that 
the client believes improper reporting may have occurred in the past.  Consequently, revealing a 
client’s identity in such post-reporting situations requires a more detailed factual analysis to 
determine whether revealing the identity would reveal some confidential communication.  
In light of this interpretation of the confidential communication exception’s 
motive analysis, the results reached in both Liebman and Arthur Anderson were incorrect since 
they permitted tax advisors to shield their clients’ identities when revealing those identities 
would not have disclosed any legally relevant or confidential client communication.  Conversely, 
absent highly unusual facts, revealing a taxpayer’s tax minimization motive by forcing an 
attorney to disclose a client’s name in tax planning situations would not be privileged under the 
confidential communication exception since no legally relevant confidential motive would be 
involved.
4. Tax Return Reporting May Nullify Privilege  Claim
The case law has long held that documents and communications directly related to 
an attorney’s preparation of a tax return are generally not privileged.149 While this exception has 
traditionally been fairly limited, a recent case has caused at least one commentator to argue that 
the attorney-client privilege never applies in tax cases since (1) tax advice is not legal advice, (2) 
149 See U.S. v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983). See also, Bruce Graves, Attorney 
Client Privilege in Preparation of Income Tax Returns: What Every Attorney-Preparer Should 
Know, 42 TAX LAW. 577 (1989); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Glen J. Schroeder, Jr., 842 
F.2d 1223, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973); Canaday v. United States, 
354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966).
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the information is not confidential, and (3) any privilege is waived when a position is ultimately 
reflected on a tax return.150 While these arguments are not overly persuasive under current law, 
they will be examined briefly.
The first argument is that when a tax advisor acts as a return preparer she is not 
performing legal work covered by the attorney-client privilege.  As traditionally applied, the 
return preparation limitation on the attorney-client privilege has only been used to require the 
disclosure of draft tax returns and documents or communications directly related to the 
preparation of the return.151  Thus, lawyers acting in a dual return preparer and legal capacity 
could continue to assert the attorney-client privilege for information communicated by the client 
to the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining her legal skills in interpreting how the law applied to a 
particular factual situation.152
However, some have interpreted the recent case of United States v. KMPG LLP153
as indicating a narrowing of the attorney-client privilege in this area.154 That case involved the 
Service investigating investor list compliance at the accounting firm of KPMG, similar to the 
Service’s investigations of Anderson and BDO discussed earlier.  In reviewing a sampling of 
allegedly privileged documents, the district court found that KPMG opinion letters on 
150 Lee Sheppard, No Privilege For Tax Planning, 98 TAX NOTES 159, ___ (Jan. 13, 2003) 
(“The practice of tax is not the practice of law. . . . Neither [accountants nor attorneys] get[] any 
kind of privilege for confidential communications made in the practice of tax. It is the practice of 
tax, not whether the lawyer works for an accounting firm or a law firm, that prevents the 
privilege from applying.”).
151 See authorities cited in note 149, supra.
152 United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he tax preparer here 
was also the taxpayers’ lawyer, and it cannot be assumed that everything transmitted to him by 
the taxpayer was intended to assist him in his tax-preparation function and thus might be 
conveyed to the IRS, rather than in his legal-representation function.”).
153 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (2002).
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consummated transactions were not eligible for the tax practitioner privilege under section 7525 
since they were prepared “in conjunction with the preparation of a tax return.”155  However, the 
court also found that similar opinion letters on completed transactions issued by law firms were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  While the court’s reasoning for the distinction is not
explained in detail, the court apparently assumed that opinions regarding the proper tax treatment 
of a completed transaction made by the client’s tax return preparer should be treated as made in 
connection with preparing the tax return and therefore would not be privileged.  On the other 
hand, similar opinions prepared by lawyers not directly involved in return preparation were 
assumed to have been made for the purpose of providing legal advice.  Viewed in this light, there 
seems to be an increased risk that tax advisors who also actually prepare their clients’ tax returns 
may have a more difficult time asserting the attorney-client privilege for their work in 
interpreting the law than has been traditionally the case.
The second argument is that tax advisors who also prepare tax returns have no 
privilege because there was no expectation of confidentiality when the information was 
conveyed to the return preparer. Since information conveyed to a return preparer typically will 
be included on the tax return and disclosed to the Service, the taxpayer has no expectation of 
confidentiality when he conveys this information.156  When the taxpayer’s legal advisor is also 
his return preparer, this mixed role may taint all information conveyed to the advisor as also 
relevant to the preparation of the tax return and therefore indicate that the taxpayer had no 
154 See Sheppard, supra note 150.
155 KMPG, 237 F. Supp. at 42.
156 See Dorokee Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 277, 280 (10th Cir. 1983) (“Even those 
courts holding that the attorney-client privilege can arise from the preparation of income tax 
returns do not apply the privilege to documents given by a client to an attorney for inclusion in 
the client’s income tax return, because such information is obviously not intended to remain 
confidential.”).
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legitimate expectation that any information provided to the advisor would be held as 
confidential.  Typically, however, the courts have limited the application of this rule to factual 
information clearly intended to be included on the actual tax return.157
The third argument that no privilege attaches if return preparation is involved is 
based on a waiver of the privilege.  That is, by merely reporting a tax shelter transaction on a tax 
return the taxpayer could be seen as waiving his privilege regarding any advice he received that 
supports the position taken on the return.  While the law currently does not support such a 
sweeping view,158 a recent case has found that merely referring to the existence of a tax opinion 
on a transaction can operate as a waiver of the privilege.  In In re: G-I Holdings, Inc.159 the 
Service was litigating the tax liability of a debtor in bankruptcy.  As part of that proceeding the 
Service sent the taxpayer a set of interrogatories.  In them the Service asked whether the debtor 
claimed that it was not liable for penalties in connection with the Service’s substantive tax claim.  
The debtor replied that it believed no penalty would be owed since the debtor acted in “good 
faith” with “reasonable cause.”160  The debtor went on to explain that it had consulted with 
outside legal advisors and others regarding the tax treatment reported on its return.  Based on this 
statement the district court found that the debtor had waived any privilege to the opinions that it 
relied on in taking its tax return reporting position.161  Consequently, the mere indication to the 
157 See, e.g., Frederick, 182 F.3d 496; United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. 
Neb. 1970) (“[A] more realistic rule would be that the client intends that only as much of the 
information will be conveyed to the government as the attorney concludes should be, and 
ultimately is, sent to the government.”).
158 See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 
U.S. 951 (1963) (refusing to find waiver of memoranda and worksheets containing confidential 
data not already published on tax return).
159 218 F.R.D. 428 (D.N.J. 2003).
160 Under section 6664 of the Code a taxpayer can avoid certain penalties if it shows it had 
reasonable cause for taking the position and acted in good faith.
161 G-I Holdings, 218 F.R.D. at 433.
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Service that outside legal advice was obtained in taking a position and that it might be used 
ultimately to defend against the future assertion of penalties, may give rise to an immediate 
waiver of the privilege for that advice.  
C. Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not Shield Identity in Tax Planning Matters
Part IV.B. demonstrated that the client-identity privilege generally is not available 
in a tax shelter context under current law.  This section addresses whether denying the client-
identity privilege in tax planning situations is appropriate as a policy matter.  After examining 
the position of the status-as-client approach on this issue and the distinct societal interests 
involved, this article concludes that limiting the scope of the attorney-client privilege in tax 
planning is highly desirable as a policy matter given the peculiar nature of the United States tax 
system.
1. Applying the Status-as-Client Approach in a Tax Planning  Context 
The status-as-client approach would protect a client’s identity in a tax planning 
context. When the Service seeks client identity information from tax practitioners in the context 
of discovering abusive transactions, it is clearly seeking to have the attorney link a client with 
specific legal advice given about a particular transaction.  The Service is seeking to discover a 
client’s status as a client (i.e., as a receiver of particular legal advice).  Consequently, this seems 
like a paradigm case for protecting client identity under the status-as-client approach.162
Nevertheless, this article maintains that the status-as-client approach reaches the wrong 
conclusion in these cases.  To understand why, it is necessary to examine the rationale for the 
162 Professor Goode would apparently apply the status-as-client test in this manner since he 
has stated that the Liebman result is “undoubtedly correct.” Goode, supra note 15, at 332
-63-
status-as-client approach and then consider the implications of that rationale in the specific 
context of tax planning.  
As discussed earlier, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to strengthen 
the efficient operation of the legal system and promote compliance with the law.163  Efficiency is 
obtained because the free and frank communications promoted by the attorney-client privilege 
provide attorneys with the facts that they require to adequately prepare their case and anticipate 
defenses.  This in turn facilitates the operation of our adversarial system of justice.  The better 
prepared each side is to any dispute, the more likely the truth will emerge from the legal contest.  
Legal compliance is promoted because encouraging free and frank consultations provides an 
attorney the ability to educate clients about their responsibilities under the law, and thereby 
creates a more law abiding citizenry.  
Achieving this desired societal result requires that clients be encouraged to seek 
out attorneys and freely communicate with them.  The status-as-client approach to the client-
identity privilege takes this underlying requirement as its starting point in developing an 
appropriate test for when the privilege should apply.  It reasons that if client identity is being 
sought as a means of determining whether the client has obtained legal advice, then at least some 
clients needing legal advice would be dissuaded from seeking it due to the fear of identity 
disclosure.164  Therefore, protecting client identity in such situations promotes the policies 
underlying the attorney-client privilege.  Conversely, in circumstances where clients would not 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
164 Goode, supra note 15, at 336-37.  Note that this conclusion implicitly relies on an 
assumption that clients would consider the mere fact that they sought legal advice to be 
somehow incriminating.  That is, if no negative inference could be inferred from knowing that an 
attorney-client relationship existed, then there would be no reason a client would be dissuaded 
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be dissuaded from seeking legal advice by disclosure of their identity, identity should not be
privileged.  This would normally be the case where client identity is being sought for some 
reason apart from determining that a person requested legal advice.  For instance, when a client 
seeks to use an attorney in a non-attorney capacity (e.g., to secretly benefit a third party, or to 
transmit a payment anonymously) forcing the revelation of the client’s identity does not dissuade 
others from seeking legal advice, it merely disabuses clients of the notion that they can employ 
attorneys to carry out their affairs in secret.  
Normally, it is fair to conclude that some clients would be dissuaded from seeking 
legal advice if they knew the fact of their consultation could become know.  Because the mere 
fact of consultation could be incriminating to them, they might eschew legal counsel.  The status-
as-client approach is based on this assumption.  However, in the tax planning context, this 
baseline assumption does not hold true.  Due to the peculiar nature of our tax system, clients will 
not be discouraged from consulting lawyers based on the risk that their identity could be 
revealed.  The only potential clients who might decide to forgo legal advice about their activities 
would be those seeking to use attorneys to add a layer of secrecy to transactions premised on a 
lack of detection by the Service (i.e., where the client’s purpose is to play the “audit lottery”).  
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to examine the unique nature of the federal income 
tax system.
For the most part, federal income tax laws do not obligate taxpayers to undertake 
or avoid particular actions under fear of penalty or sanction.  Aside from penalties for fraud and 
penalties imposed for failure to file returns or pay taxes owed, most of the Code is dedicated to 
from seeking legal counsel merely due to the fact that the existence of their relationship might 
become known. 
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merely describing the tax treatment of a taxpayer’s receipts, disbursements and transactions.165
Absent the creation of fraudulent or sham transactions, there is generally no legal prohibition 
imposed by the tax law on a taxpayer undertaking any transaction, no matter how tax motivated.
Rather, the Code merely attempts to define how such transactions impact on the calculation of a 
person’s taxes.  That is, does the transaction create items of income, gain, loss or deduction that 
are allowed to be accounted for in calculating one’s tax liability.  Overly aggressive reporting of 
a transaction may be illegal, but engaging in such a transaction itself is not illegal or prohibited 
by the Code.
As a direct consequence, it has long been acknowledged that taxpayers are free to 
structure their affairs in the manner that results in minimizing their tax liability.166 Tax planning 
is not only accepted by the Code, Congress often counts on taxpayers engaging in such planning 
when it adopts provisions of the Code intended to encourage or discourage (but not prescribe or 
proscribe) certain taxpayer behaviors or transactions.167  As a result, the mere knowledge that a 
taxpayer has engaged counsel to assist in her tax planning carries no stigma or inference of 
wrongdoing which would dissuade a taxpayer from pursuing legal advice even if her status as a 
client were to become known.168
165 See Kayle, supra note 145, at 551 (“Aside from a few relatively trivial items like return 
filing requirements, the tax law does not have many prescriptions or proscriptions.  Tax law 
simply ascribes a tax consequence (taxable vs. nontaxable; deductible vs. nondeductible; benefit 
available vs. unavailable) to taxpayer conduct.”).
166 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Superior Oil Co. v. 
Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630–31 (1916); 
Comm’r. v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting opinion).
167 For instance, Congress grants an interest deduction for mortgages on individual 
residences to encourage home ownership.
168 To the extent that a taxpayer is seeking advice regarding a committing a tax fraud or 
other criminal activity, she would be no more dissuaded from seeking counsel than under the 
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Additionally, the self-assessment nature of the United States tax system creates a 
very different regulatory paradigm than is the case with other codified bodies of law.169
Taxpayers must undertake an evaluation of how the tax laws apply to their peculiar situation and 
must report their conclusions to the Service in an annual tax return.170  Conversely, the Service 
may audit anyone randomly without any belief that they have reported their income incorrectly.  
Given the scope of economic activity in the United States that must be reported and taxed, it is 
clearly impossible for the Service to examine more than a small fraction of filed tax returns.  
Since placing the burden on the Service of ferreting out all the transactions impacting the tax 
liability of millions of taxpayers would be insurmountable, the entire tax system is based on 
disclosure and fair reporting by taxpayers.171  Taxpayers are obligated to review their records and 
transactions and apply the proper tax characterizations under the Code.  The Service has been 
granted sweeping powers to gather information regarding tax matters in order to check that the 
self-assessment system is operating properly.172  The tax system functions because taxpayers 
normal attorney-client privilege since the privilege would not protect such a client in any event 
due to the traditional crime-fraud exception. 
169 See Kayle, supra note 145, at 551-52.
170 Treas. Reg. 1.461-1(a)(3) (“Each year’s return should be complete in itself, and taxpayers 
shall ascertain the facts necessary to make a correct return.”). See also, Wiseley v. Comm’r, 13 
T.C. 253, 256 (1949) (taxpayer must file a correct return); Valverde v. Comm’r, 53 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 628, 629 (1987) (taxpayer has obligation to file a correct return); I.R.C. § 6065 (requiring 
returns to be signed under penalty of perjury).
171 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815-16 (1984) (“Our complex and 
comprehensive system of federal taxation, relying as it does upon self-assessment and reporting, 
demands that all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant information to the taxing 
authorities. Without such disclosure, and the concomitant power of the Government to compel 
disclosure, our national tax burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed.  In order to 
encourage effective tax investigations, Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive 
information-gathering authority…”); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)
(describing the system as one where “obligations of disclosure exist [] under a system largely 
dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive”).
172 See 1 Internal Revenue Manual: Audit (CCH) 4015.1 (June 29, 1984), at 7006 (“The 
mission of the service is to encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary 
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have faith in the basic fairness of the system.173  When taxpayers believe that others are avoiding 
their fair share of the tax burden, they lose faith in the system and are more likely to cheat.174  In 
short, the tax system is essentially self-enforced, but such self-enforcement only works if 
taxpayers believe that the reporting requirements of the system, coupled with the broad powers 
of the Service to check on the degree of voluntary compliance, ensures  that everyone is applying 
the tax laws fairly.175
Since taxpayers are obligated to disclose their transactions and their tax 
consequences to the Service, it is especially difficult to see why a taxpayer would be dissuaded 
from seeking tax advice regarding the structuring and reporting of those transactions by the fact 
that their attorney might also need to provide such information to the Service.  Only those who 
are trying to evade the built-in disclosure requirements of the system and wish to force the 
compliance with the tax laws and regulations and to conduct itself so as to warrant the highest 
degree of public confidence in its integrity and efficiency.”); I.R.S. Policy Statement P-1-1 (Dec. 
18, 1993), 1 Internal Revenue Manual: Administration (CCH) at 1303-25 (“The purpose of the 
Internal Revenue Service is to collect the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost; serve 
the public by continually improving the quality of our products and services; and perform in a 
manner warranting the highest degree of public confidence in our integrity, efficiency and 
fairness.”).
173 See Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique Of The Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1988) (“[T]ax shelters destroy the horizontal and vertical equity of the tax system 
and lead average taxpayers to feel that they are fools for paying their fair shares of the income 
tax burden, thereby undermining the foundation of the self-assessment system.”); Douglas A. 
Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 Fla. 
Tax Rev. 327, 351-52 (1995) (“Our self-assessment system of taxation relies on a willingness of 
the populace to report honestly to the government, and that willingness rests on a popular belief 
that the government’s system of taxation is fair.”); LILLIAN DORIS, THE AMERICAN WAY IN 
TAXATION: INTERNAL REVENUE, 1862-1963 1, 2 (1994) (noting that the self-assessment system 
is threatened if the public loses confidence that the tax laws are operating fairly). 
174 See Treasury White Paper, supra note 3, at ¶ 95; Joel Slemrod & Varsha Venkatesh, 
Public Attitudes About Taxation and the 2000 Presidential Campaign, 83 TAX NOTES 1799, 
1799 (June 21, 1999).
175 See Darrell, The Tax Practitioner’s Duty to His Client and His Government, 7 PRAC. 
LAW. 23, 38 (1961) (the U.S. tax system is “dependent for enforcement primarily upon voluntary 
compliance and not police state methods”). 
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Service into an active investigative policing posture would have reason to fear attorney 
disclosure of their identity.  Consequently, it is not the provision of legal advice that would be 
dissuaded by denying the client-identity privilege, it is only the use of attorneys to defeat the 
intended transparency of the tax system that would be discouraged.
This reality should be contrasted with that of other bodies of regulatory law that 
dictate particular behaviors, impose sanctions for non-compliance, and are policed for breaches 
by an enforcement agency.  In such situations, if clients consult an attorney regarding their 
obligations under the relevant law they may have legitimate concerns about maintaining the 
secrecy of their consultation.  Since the enforcement agency is affirmatively charged with 
investigating suspected breaches of the law, it might seek leads from attorneys. So, for instance, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) might seek client lists from attorneys known 
to specialize in insider trading cases or other securities defense work as a means of identifying 
clients likely to have violated the securities laws.  If the SEC is successful in such attempts, this 
might well dissuade clients from seeking legal advice because it would subject them to scrutiny 
they would not have triggered without seeking legal advice and this scrutiny may in turn subject 
them to penalties for their behavior.  In the tax world, however, taxpayers have an affirmative 
obligation to make their transactions and their tax treatments known to the Service.  Thus, 
merely seeking legal advice would not generally create any increased scrutiny that they would 
fear.  
Additionally, while an agency like the SEC might apply penalties or other 
sanctions in connection with any discovered violations of the underlying law, in the tax realm the 
impact of increased scrutiny is only that the correct tax treatment of an item will be determined.  
As a result the taxpayer may owe more or less tax, but no penalty will be imposed for its action 
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in undertaking the transaction.  While the taxpayer’s reporting of the transaction could 
potentially give rise to a penalty, under the self-assessment system taxpayers have an obligation 
to take supportable positions and penalties only become relevant when this obligation is not 
satisfied.  In most instances where taxpayers are found to have underpaid their taxes no penalties 
apply because sufficient support existed for the taxpayer’s position.  Indeed, even if the 
taxpayer’s position is found to lack the required level of support, no penalty will apply if the 
taxpayer can show the position was taken in good faith and that she had reasonable cause to 
believe her position was supportable.176 The impact of these rules is that for any return position 
a taxpayer should believe that the position is supportable and should not fear incurring a penalty 
even if the position is ultimately proven incorrect.  Consequently, while increased scrutiny by the 
Service might result in additional taxes being owed, the risk of creating such increased scrutiny 
would not cause a taxpayer to avoid seeking counsel. Further, seeking counsel is likely to ensure 
that the position taken is one that in fact reaches the correct tax result, so that even if increased 
scrutiny applies the taxpayer would generally expect no negative tax impact to result.  Since the 
taxpayer must believe her position is supportable under the law and understands that the Service 
is always free to audit her position, she should have no fear of scrutiny by the Service.  Indeed, if 
she fears scrutiny by the Service, this indicates she is taking her tax reporting position based not 
on a good faith belief in its merits but on a belief that the Service will not discover the 
transaction.  This is counter to her duty as a taxpayer to fairly make her tax situation known to 
the Service under the self-assessment system.
The above discussion has demonstrated that the peculiar nature of the tax law is 
such that requiring tax advisors to reveal client identities should not dissuade taxpayers from 
176 I.R.C. § 6664.
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seeking tax planning advice.  Consequently, the status-as-client approach yields an incorrect 
result when applied to tax planning situations.  In the tax context there are no negative inferences 
to be derived from the mere fact that a taxpayer consulted counsel regarding the proper tax 
treatment of her transactions.  Additionally, the affirmative obligation placed on taxpayers to 
fairly self-report their tax situation to the Service creates an environment where no taxpayer 
should fear scrutiny unless they are affirmatively counting on non-detection of their transactions.  
If the latter is the case, then facilitating the ability of taxpayers to use the attorney-client 
privilege to defeat the intended transparency of the self-assessment tax system would cause 
serious harm to the tax system as a whole.  As discussed below, this potential for harming the tax 
system provides an independent justification for limiting the client-identity privilege in tax 
planning situations.
2. Competing Societal Interests Warrant Limiting the Attorney- Client 
Privilege
The previous section demonstrated that while the status-as-client approach 
reaches the wrong result in the context of tax planning, denying the client-identity privilege in 
tax situations still should not dissuade taxpayers from seeking legal advice.  Thus, denying the 
privilege does not work against the goal of promoting compliance with the law.  This section 
goes further and shows that granting an identity privilege in tax planning matters would cause 
significant harm to the tax system which would far outweigh any countervailing benefits from 
applying the privilege.
As discussed earlier, the very existence of the attorney-client privilege reflects a 
societal decision that the benefits of the privilege (promoting the adversary system of justice and 
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compliance with the law) outweigh the detriment (impeding the search for the truth).177
Nevertheless, the societal considerations are sufficiently unique in the tax planning context to 
warrant a reappraisal of whether the attorney-client privilege should be applied in a more limited 
fashion.  
Most importantly, the harm the privilege causes to the search for the truth is 
considerably greater in the tax context than in other areas of the law.  Permitting clients to use 
the attorney-client privilege to shield their identity and therefore their transactions from the 
Service severely harms the self-assessment tax system by allowing certain taxpayers to avoid the 
fair reporting and disclosure obligations essential to the system’s proper func tioning.178
Allowing certain taxpayers to engage in aggressive tax planning that is hidden from Service 
scrutiny promotes the public’s belief that tax cheating is widespread, which leads to the 
perception that the tax system is unfair.  This in turn could seriously damage the operation of the 
self-assessment system.  Given the limited resources of the Service and the many millions of tax 
returns filed each year, curtailing the Service’s ability to identify potentially abusive transactions 
places too great a burden on the Service.  Indeed, Congress’s purpose in enacting the registration 
and listing requirements for potentially abusive transactions was to ensure that the Service would 
have the tools necessary to serve its role in maintaining the fairness of the self assessment 
system:
177 See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
178 See Special Comm. on the Lawyer’s Role in Tax Practice, The Ass’n of the Bar of the 
City of New York, The Lawyer’s Role in Tax Practice, 36 TAX LAW. 865, 882 (1983) (“As a 
consequence of the aggressive positions taken by many taxpayers and the limited number of 
returns that can be effectively audited, the Government loses revenue it should receive, resulting 
in an inequitable sharing of the tax burden among taxpayers, and, most important, a growing 
disrespect for the fairness of the tax system.”).
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Congress was concerned that promoters of and investors in 
syndicated investments and tax shelters were profiting from the 
inability of the Internal Revenue Service to examine effectively 
every return.  These promoters knew that even if a tax scheme they 
marketed was clearly faulty, some investors’ incorrect returns 
would escape detection and many others would enjoy a substantial 
deferral of tax while the Internal Revenue Service searched for 
their returns and coordinated its handling of similar cases.
The new requirement that promoters keep lists of customers and 
investments will enable the Internal Revenue Service to identify 
quickly all of the participants in related tax-shelter investments.  
As a result, taxpayers claiming improper treatment will not escape 
detection and investors in similar schemes will receive more 
uniform treatment.179
Additionally, allowing the attorney-client privilege to shelter client identity in the 
tax planning context essentially promotes non-compliance with the law since it encourages 
taxpayers to believe they can shield their aggressive positions from scrutiny.  Normally the 
attorney-client privilege fosters compliance with the law since attorneys can educate clients on 
the law and act to dissuade improper actions before they are undertaken.  However, applying the 
attorney-client privilege to protect client identity in tax planning matters encourages taxpayers to 
take riskier reporting positions relying on the low chance of detection.  The baseline of the self-
assessment system is that taxpayers should be taking positions based on a fair and accurate 
evaluation of how the law applies to their particular circumstances.  Factoring the low risk of 
detection into such evaluations results in taxpayers taking a more aggressive view of the law than 
is optimal for the efficient functioning of the tax system.180
179 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 481 (Comm. Print 1984).
180 For this reason, the Service requires tax practitioners to exclude the risk of detection as 
factor in determining whether a taxpayer has sufficient support to take a position on a tax return.  
31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d)(1).
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In light of the significant detriments that would arise if the attorney-client 
privilege is applied broadly to protect the identity of tax planning clients, the attorney-client 
privilege should be limited as it applies to client identity in this context.  Given the preeminent 
importance of disclosure, equality, and fairness in the efficient functioning of the tax system, 
client identity should not be protected.  Additionally, denying such protection should not 
negatively impact the normal benefits gained from applying the attorney-client privilege.  Due to 
the nature of the tax system, clients would not be discouraged from seeking legal advice merely 
because their transactions would be discoverable through client lists.  Further, denying the 
privilege here actually promotes compliance with the self-assessment system by indicating to 
taxpayers that they cannot rely on non-detection as a basis for taking aggressive tax positions.  
Consequently, as a policy matter, the attorney-client privilege should not shield the identity of 
clients engaged in tax planning, regardless of whether such planning relates to a tax shelter 
transaction.181
V. Conclusion
The promotion of aggressive tax shelter transactions has created a difficult 
problem for the United States tax system.  In order to preserve the integrity of the self-
assessment tax system the Service needs to identify such transactions and, when appropriate, 
challenge them.  However, such transactions are often explicitly designed to be difficult for the 
Service to detect.  To confront this trend the Service has promulgated regulations requiring 
attorneys and other promoters to maintain lists of investors in certain types of tax motivated 
181 Note, however, that the same policy considerations are not implicated in criminal tax 
matters or in situations where tax advice is sought after the filing of a return.  In these situations 
a client’s state of mind may be highly relevant and negative inferences that might be drawn from 
such a client seeking counsel could warrant invoking the attorney-client privilege.  The analysis 
here is limited to pre-filing tax planning advice.
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transactions.  The Service has also aggressively contested the application of the attorney-client 
privilege to shield the identities of clients engaged in such transactions. In effect, the Service is 
forcing tax attorneys to divulge their “naughty” clients to the Service.  While requiring attorneys 
to maintain such client lists may appear contrary to the attorney-client privilege, this article has 
demonstrated that denying a client-identity privilege in the tax planning context is appropriate
both under current law and from a broader policy perspective.
Under current law a client’s identity is generally only privileged if revealing her 
identity would be tantamount to revealing a confidential client communication.  While revealing 
a client’s motive in seeking legal advice is usually sufficient to invoke the confidential 
communication exception, this article maintains this exception applies only if the confidential 
motive requirement is explicitly satisfied.  That is, it must be proven that any motive revealed, in 
fact, also reveals some confidential communication.  In the context of tax shelter transactions, 
merely revealing that a client wished to engage in transactions intended to decrease her tax 
burden would not qualify as a confidential motive.  Such a generalized motive conveys no 
confidential client-specific information and is not relevant to any legal issue the tax advisor 
might be called upon to address.  All taxpayers have a motive of structuring their affairs to pay 
the least tax legally owed.  Nothing confidential is revealed if this is the only motive that is 
revealed by identifying a client.  Consequently, this article maintains that cases like Liebman and
Arthur Anderson were wrongly decided since they ignored the confidential motive requirement 
when they applied the confidential communication exception.
Similarly, the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege indicates that the 
privilege should not be applied to clients’ identities in tax planning situations.  The primary 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote compliance with the law.  The existence of 
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the privilege reflects a longstanding societal decision that the benefits from the privilege 
outweigh its costs.  Nevertheless, the peculiar nature of the tax system creates a situation where 
applying the privilege to protect clients’ identities frustrates, rather than furthers, these societal 
goals.  Allowing a client-identity privilege in tax planning matters allows taxpayers to avoid their 
obligation to take fair reporting positions and make those positions know to the Service. 
Consequently, the harm to the search for the truth is greater in the tax context than in other areas 
of the law where the privilege would normally apply.  Further, extending the privilege to shield 
transactions from view encourages taxpayers to take aggressive tax positions based on an audit 
lottery mentality.  Thus, in the peculiar context of the self-assessment tax system, the client-
identity privilege actually promotes non-compliance with the law.  Additionally, society’s goal 
of encouraging clients to seek legal advice is not impaired by denying the privilege to tax 
planning situations.  Here again, the peculiar nature of the tax system indicates that taxpayers 
should not be dissuaded from seeking legal advice regarding their tax situation even if they know 
their advisors may need to reveal their identities.  Consequently, as a policy matter, it is 
appropriate to limit the application of the attorney-client privilege in the cont ext of tax planning, 
irrespective of how aggressive such planning is.
While the attorney-client privilege serves a valuable role in the legal system of the 
United States, there should be room to tailor the privilege to best serve its function in particular 
areas of the law.  In the tax realm, limiting the scope of the privilege as it relates to client identity 
is a small price to pay for the large benefit of promoting the efficient operation of the self-
assessment system.  The actions of the Service in requiring attorneys to maintain client lists for 
tax motivated transactions and in challenging attorney assertions of client-identity privilege are 
necessary steps in protecting the fairness of the self-assessment system.  Given the peculiar 
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nature of the tax system, the Service’s actions appropriately reflect how the attorney-client 
privilege should be interpreted in the context of tax planning.
